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Developments in Florida Corporate Law and
Securities Regulation*
ARTHUR R. Louv**
The author traces and analyzes some of the more important
judicial and legislative developments in the areas of corporate
law and securities regulation occurring during the survey period.
Among the topics discussed are the enactment of the Florida
General Corporation Act, interpretive decisions on venue, corpo-
rate amenability to long-arm jurisdiction, the rights and respon-
sibilities of corporate management, the rights of shareholders,
shareholder derivative actions, voluntary dissolution, the enact-
ment of the Investor Protection Act and related interpretations
of the Division of Securities, the interface between federal and
state securities law, and the anti-fraud and remedial provisions
of the Florida Sale of Securities Law.
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I. CORPORATE LAW
A. New Legislation
The Florida General Corporation Act which took effect on Jan-
uary 1, 1976,1 was subject to limited revision and clarification in the
1976 and 1977 legislative sessions. The 1976 amendments2 revised
and clarified certain sections of the Act by: (1) eliminating the
distinction between a resident agent for service of process and a
registered agent;3 (2) authorizing a corporation to serve as a general
partner or as a limited partner of a limited partnership;' (3) provid-
ing that the defense of ultra vires does not render a corporate en-
cumbrance of real or personal property invalid;' (4) allowing the
reservation of a corporate name to be renewed;' (5) permitting the
use of a promissory note in payment for shares of capital stock;7 (6)
1. FLA. STAT. §§ 607.001-.414 (1975). See also FLORIDA CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION,
BASIC CORPORATE PRACTICE (1977).
2. 1976 Fla. Laws, ch. 76-209 (current version at FLA. STAT. 88 607.011-.371 (1977)).
3. Id. 8H 1, 5 & 20 (current version at FLA. STAT. §§ 48.091, 607.034 & .361(4) (1977)).
4. Id. § 2 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 607.011(2)(n) (1977)).
5. Id. § 3 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 607,021 (1977)).
6. Id. § 4 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 607.027(1) (1977)).
7. Id. § 6 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 607.054(6) (1977)). As revised, this section
provides that "[fluture services shall not constitute payment or part payment of issuance
of shares of a corporation." Id. Previously, this section provided that "[n]either promissory
notes nor future services shall constitute payment or part payment for the issuance of shares
of a corporation." FLA. STAT. § 607.054(6) (1975). Presumably, therefore, promissory notes
may be utilized to acquire non-assessable shares of capital stock in a Florida corporation. It
should be noted, however, that shares of stock with par value must be issued for consideration
"having a value not less than the par value of the shares issued." FLA. STAT. § 607.054(1)
(1977). In comparison, shares of capital stock without par value "may be issued for such
consideration as is determined from time to time by the Board of Directors." Id. § 607.054(2).
It may be, therefore, that non-assessable par value shares may not be issued for promissory
notes except to the extent that the total consideration exceeds the par value. But see Lundqu-
ist v. Gulfshore Television Corp., 328 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976). In such a case only the
par value amount would have to be paid in cash or other property and the excess amount
could be paid by promissory note. With repect to no par value stock, the board of directors
should be able to determine that a promissory note is sufficient consideration to issue, such
stock as fully paid and non-assessable. See, e.g., 11 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, §§ 5182-98 (rev. perm. ed. 1971); Speakman v. Bernstein, 59 F.2d 52
(5th Cir. 1952); Cahall v. Lofland, 12 Del. Ch. 299, 114 A. 224 (1921).
In determining whether a promissory note may be received for the issuance of non-
assessable par value capital stock, it is important to remember that the authority of the board
of directors is not to determine what consideration may be received but, rather, the value of
the consideration. For this reason, it is suggested that if it is desirable to utilize a promissory
note in connection with the issuance of capital stock of a Florida corporation, then either no
par value stock should be utilized or capital stock having a minimal value (e.g., one cent per
share) should be utilized and the purchase price of the stock established in excess of par value.
In the latter case, the acquiring stockholder can purchase his shares by cash payment equal
in par value plus a promissory note for the balance. This would result in a minimum amount
of a paid-in capital (the cash payment) and a maximum amount of paid-in surplus (the note
payments).
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broadening the right of access to the corporate books and records to
those persons who have held one-quarter of one percent of the shares
of capital stock of a company for at least six months;8 (7) requiring
the filing of one set of articles of incorporation and articles of disso-
lution rather than in duplicate;' (8) permitting, rather than requir-
ing, a copy of the articles of merger or consolidation to be recorded
in the public records for purposes of clarifying the chain of title to
corporate real property;'" (9) requiring a foreign surviving or new
corporation in a merger or consolidation to obtain an authorization
to do business as a foreign corporation only if it intends to transact
business in the state and, in all cases, requiring it to file an under-
taking with the Department of State that it will promptly pay to
dissenting shareholders of a Florida corporation which is the subject
of the merger or consolidation the amounts to which they are enti-
tled under the Act;" (10) providing that voluntary dissolution pro-
ceedings may be revoked only prior to the filing of the articles of
dissolution bVy the Department of State;'" (11) clarifying the provi-
sions establishing proceedings to liquidate the assets and business
of a Florida corporation by specifically stating that such proceedings
do not affect the enforceability of recorded and perfected security
interests, mortgages and liens on corporate real and personal prop-
erty and the rights of persons in possession of such property; 3 (12)
establishing that the acts of a majority of the board of trustees of a
corporation in dissolution constitute the acts of the board and pro-
viding for a means of conclusively establishing authority to act by
the board; 4 (13) clarifying the procedure for a foreign corporation
to do business in the state under a name other than its corporate
name; 5 (14) expressly setting forth that the failure of a foreign cor-
8. 1976 Fla. Laws, ch. 76-209, § 7 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 607.157(4) (1977)).
Previously, any stockholder who had been such for a period of at least six months had the
right to inspect the books and records of account, the minutes of meetings and records of
stockholders. Presumably, no change in prior Florida case decisional law will occur regarding
the additional rights of stockholders to audit the books and records of Florida corporations
for proper purposes. See, e.g., Sage v. Perrone, 313 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
9. 1976 Fla. Laws, ch. 76-209, §§ 8, 11 & 13 (current version at FLA. STAT. §§ 607.161,
.251(2)(a) & .267(1) (1977)).
10. Id. § 9 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 607.224(3) (1977)).
11. Id. § 10 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 607.234(1) (1977)). Previously, the surviving
or new foreign corporation had to file additional undertakings with the Department of
State that it could be served with process in Florida in any proceeding for the enforcement
of any obligation of the domestic corporation which was a party to the merger or consolidation
and an irrevocable appointment of the Secretary of State as its agent to accept such service
of process.
12. Id. § 12 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 607.261(1) (1977)).
13. Id. § 14 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 607.284 (1977)).
14. Id. § 15 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 607.304(4) (1977)).
15. Id. § 16 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 607.314 (1977)).
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poration to obtain authority to transact business in the state does
not impair the validity of any deeds, mortgages, security interests
and liens as well as any contracts or other acts of the corporation;"6
(15) requiring that the name and mailing address of each director
be included in the annual report; 7 (16) empowering the Department
of State to promulgate rules to carry out its duties and functions
under the Act; 18 and (17) making editorial and clarifying revisions
to certain sections without substantive change. 9
The 1977 session passed a reviser's bill to conform certain sec-
tions of the act to bracketed words and phrases editorially inserted
or substituted in the interest of clarity in the 1975 Florida Statutes
and its 1976 Supplement.10 In addition, effective January 1, 1978,
the fee for filing the corporate annual report has been increased from
five dollars to ten dollars.2'
B. Recent Decisions
1. VENUE
In general, actions against Florida corporations may be brought
only in the county in which the corporation has or usually keeps an
office for the transaction of its customary business, where the cause
of action accrued or where the property which is the subject matter
of the litigation is located. On the other hand, actions against for-
eign corporations doing business in the state are properly brought
in the county where the corporation has an agent or other represent-
ative, where the cause of action accrued or where the property which
is the subject matter of the litigation is located."2.When an action is filed against two or more defendants residing
in different counties, the action may be brought in any county in
which any defendant resides. Of course, a Florida corporation may
have more than one office for the transaction of its customary busi-
ness and a foreign corporation may have agents and representatives
in more than one county in Florida. Therefore, corporations may
have more than one "residence." 2' In Walt Disney World Co. v.
16. Id. § 18 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 607.354(2) (1977)).
17. Id. § 19 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 607.357(1)(f) (1977)).
18. Id. § 21 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 607.371 (1977)).
19. Id. §§ 13, 17 (current version at FLA. STAT. §§ 607.267, .337 (1977)).
20. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-174.
21. FLA. STAT. § 607.361(2) (1977).
22. Id. § 47.051. The election of venue is with the plaintiff and the burden of pleading
and proving that venue is improper is upon the defendant. See, e.g., Florida Forms, Inc. v.
Barkett Computer Serv., Inc., 311 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
23. FLA. STAT. § 47.021 (1977).
24. See, e.g., Enfinger v. Baxley, 96 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1957).
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Leff,25 the plaintiff filed a personal injury action against the corpo-
rate defendant, Disney, and its corporate insurer in Broward
County, Florida. Disney, a foreign corporation, had only one
"residence" which was located in Orange County, Florida, while the
corporate insurer, also a foreign corporation, had "residences" in
both Orange and Broward Counties. Nevertheless, the District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that the plaintiff's right to
institute the litigation in Broward County against multiple defen-
dants pursuant to the venue statute was not applicable inasmuch
as this section applied only when the co-defendants resided in dif-
ferent counties." When all of the defendants in an action had resi-
dences in one county, the section did not apply even though one or
more corporate co-defendants resided in other counties. In so hold-
ing, the court relied on the rationale and decisions of the Supreme
Court of Florida and the District Courts of Appeal for the Second
and Third Districts in a number of similar cases. 7 In addition, the
court rejected an argument of the plaintiff that Disney was actively
doing business in Broward County by virtue of its advertisements
and solicitations of business throughout Florida and, therefore, that
venue was proper in Broward County. In so ruling, the court re-
jected, as dicta, the comment of the supreme court in Mann v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,28 that where a foreign corporation is
doing business may be relevant even though that fact is not within
the statutory standard.
2. LONG-ARM JURISDICTION
The principal long-arm statutes available to a plaintiff against
a foreign corporation are found in sections 48.181(1) and
48.193(1) (a) of the Florida Statutes (1977). Essentially, they provide
that a foreign corporation which operates, conducts, engages in or
carries on a business or business venture in Florida or has an office
or agency in the state subjects itself to the jurisdiction of Florida
courts for any cause of action arising out of the transaction or opera-
tion of such activity.29 In addition, section 48.181(3) of the Florida
Statutes (1977) provides that any corporation which sells, consigns
25. 323 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 604 and the cases cited therein; Cadillac Fairview Corp. v. SWD Inv., Inc.,
343 So. 2d 933 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977); Warren Bros. Co. v. Joslin, 338 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1976).
28. 300 So. 2d 666, 668 (Fla. 1974). "We conclude that, when suing a foreign corporation,
one has the right to bring one's action anywhere business is transacted in Florida .... Id.
29. Compare FLA. STAT. § 48.181(1) (1977) with FLA. STAT. § 48.193 (1)(a) (1977).
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or leases tangible or intangible personal property through brokers,
jobbers, wholesalers or distributors to any person in the state is
conclusively presumed to be operating, conducting, engaging in or
carrying on a business venture in the state, even though such con-
duct may not constitute carrying on of business for purposes of
section 48.181(1).3
0
During the survey period a number of courts reaffirmed that,
for purposes of section 48.181(1), the plaintiff has the burden of
proving facts which clearly justify, as a matter of law, that substi-
tuted service of process pursuant to the statute was proper.3' Simi-
larly, the courts held that the burden of proof for the jurisdictional
purposes of section 48.193(1) was also on the plaintiff."
During the survey period, a federal district court ruled that the
similarity between language contained in sections 48.181(1) and
48.193(1)(a) was such that judicial interpretation regarding what
constituted doing business for purposes of either statute should be
the same. In Escambia Treating Co. v. Otto Candies, Inc.,13 the
court found that the language of section 48.193(1)(a) was identical
to the language of section 48.181(1), and, therefore, the Florida state
courts would give the language contained in the former the same
construction as the language in the latter had been given by the
earlier decisions. 3' The court further noted that the comment in
Youngblood v. Citrus Associates of the New York Cotton Exchange,
Inc., ' 5 to the effect that the statute requires more activity or contact
than was currently required by the decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States, has been supported by a recent federal deci-
sion, 3 notwithstanding earlier decisions which suggested that sec-
tion 48.181(1) should be interpreted as coextensive with the limits
of constitutional due process.
3 7
30. See Dinsmore v. Martin Blumenthal Assoc., 314 So. 2d 561, 564 (Fla. 1975) (constru-
ing FLA. STAT. §§ 48.181(1) & (3) (1975)).
31. See, e.g., Palmer Johnson Yachts v. Ray Richard, Inc., 347 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1977); Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Banco Del Atlantico, 343 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1977).
32. See, e.g., Palmer Johnson Yachts v. Ray Richard, Inc., 347 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1977); Simboli v. Miller, 326 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976); Georgia Say. & Loan Serv. Corp.
v. Delwood Estates, Inc., 315 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975), cert. denied, 341 So. 2d 236
(Fla. 1976). For an excellent summary of the procedural aspects of challenging long-arm
service of process, see Elmex Corp. v. Atlantic Fed. Say. & Loan Assoc., 325 So. 2d 58, 61-62
(Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
33. 405 F. Supp. 1235 (N.D. Fla. 1975).
34. Id. at 1236.
35. 276 So. 2d 505, 507-08 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973). See also American Baseball Cap, Inc. v.
Duzinski, 308 So. 2d 639 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1975).
36. 405 F. Supp. at 1236. See also Note, In Personarn Jurisdiction-Due Process and
Florida's Short "Long-Arm," 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 336 (1971).
37. See Babson Bros. Co. v. Allison, 298 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974); Fischer v.
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Disputes regarding the reach of Florida's long-arm statute prin-
cipally centered around two aspects of the statute: first, on a case
by case basis, what acts constitute "doing business" in Florida for
purposes of sections 48.181(1) and 48.193; and second, what degree
of control over the property of a distributor is necessary for a finding
that a foreign corporation is doing business in Florida under the
same sections.
In Dinsmore v. Martin Blumenthal Associates,38 the Supreme
Court of Florida discussed both aspects of "doing business" in Flor-
ida. The plaintiff, a broker, sued the individual nonresident defen-
dants to recover a brokerage commission resulting from the ex-
change of stock of a foreign corporation with a Florida corporation.
In effecting the exchange, the negotiations and closing of the trans-
action occurred outside of Florida and on only one occasion did any
of the individual nonresident defendants come to Florida for a meet-
ing with an officer of the Florida corporation. In finding section
48.181(1) inapplicable, the court noted that the plaintiff failed to
show that the defendants were conducting a general course of busi-
ness activity in Florida and held that a nonresident's mere giving
of a listing to sell stock in a foreign corporation to a brokerage firm
which does business in Florida does not indicate a general course of
business activity.
The court further analyzed the case to determine whether or not
section 48.181(3) could be applied on the basis that the nonresidents
sold personal property by means of a broker located in Florida.
First, the court ruled that an exchange of securities falls within the
ambit of a sale of personal property for purposes of the Act.'" Next,
the court held that the prior decisions of lower courts regarding the
need for control of the property or of the broker in disposing of the
property in Florida should be adopted and applied in this case."
Applying this standard, the court found that the listing of the secur-
ities for sale with the broker by the nonresident defendants indi-
cated the requisite control over the activities of the broker inasmuch
as the ownership of the securities remained with the nonresident
defendants and, therefore, they could exercise such discretion as
Premiere Realty Co., 298 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
38. 314 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1975).
39. Id. at 564.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 564-66 (citing with approval Talcott v. Midnight Publishing Corp., 427 F.2d
1277 (5th Cir. 1970); Jenkins v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 361 (N.D. Fla. 1962);
Cook-Waite Lab., Inc. v. Napier, 166 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964); Fawcett Publications,
Inc. v. Brown, 146 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962); Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Rand, 144
So. 2d 512 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962)).
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they wished in the disposition of the securities in Florida.42 Finally,
however, the court found that the-securities were not sold "in the
state" as the closing of the transaction occurred elsewhere. The
court held that if the signing of the agreement for sale and the
closing took place outside the state of Florida, section 48.181(3)
could not be invoked to submit the nonresident defendants to the
jurisdiction of the Florida courts. 3
The decision of the supreme court in Dinsmore is neither sur-
prising nor striking. Other than the holding that an exchange of
securities constitutes a sale of property, the case did not "plow any
new ground" in this area of the law. Rather, the court followed a
preexisting line of lower court decisions and confirmed the comment
of the Fourth District in Youngblood that more activity and contact
are required in Florida to sustain "long-arm" service of process than
are currently required by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States."
A number of other courts followed the letter and spirit of
Dinsmore. For example, in Spencer Boat Co. v. Liutermoza, the
Fifth Circuit held that section 48.181(1) was not broad enough to
"long-arm" nonresident defendants who had purchased a pleasure
boat while visiting Florida and who had refused to pay a bill for
repair work done in Florida which was mailed to their residence out
of state. The court noted that the Florida courts have consistently
held that the nonresident defendant must be seeking pecuniary ben-
efit in Florida in order to bring his conduct within the ambit of
section 48.181(1) and that, absent the availability of section
48.193(1)(g) (regarding breaches of contract in this state by failure
of performance of acts required to be performed in the state), such
transactions did not constitute doing business within the meaning
of section 48.181(1)." Similarly, in Elmex Corp. v. Atlantic Federal
Savings & Loan Association,47 the District Court of Appeal, Fourth
District, held that the single isolated act of a nonresident defendant
shipping merchandise from Texas to the plaintiff in Florida did not
constitute "doing business" in Florida so as to invoke the applica-
tion of section 48.181(1). The decision of the same court in
42. 314 So. 2d at 566.
43. Id. at 567.
44. Youngblood v. Citrus Assocs. of the N.Y. Cotton Exch., 276 So. 2d 505, 508 (Fla. 4th
Dist. 1973).
45. 498 F.2d 332 (5th Cir. 1974).
46. Id. at 333 (construing FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1) (1973)).
47. 325 So. 2d 58, 63 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976); accord, Radlin v. Aero Sys., Inc., 340 So. 2d
1260, 1261 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
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Buckingham v. Atlas Aircraft Corp,48 represents an application of
the same basic principle as applied in Elmex to the opposite factual
situation. In Buckingham, the court found that the nonresident
corporate defendant was in the regular commercial business of sell-
ing aircraft manufactured in Florida. The defendant received title
to many of the aircraft in Florida, took delivery in Florida, procured
pilots to fly the aircraft to Colorado and, on occasion, brought cus-
tomers to Florida to pick up the aircraft they had purchased. The
court noted that while no single one of these activities or events
alone would be sufficient to subject the nonresident corporate defen-
dant to the jurisdiction of the Florida courts, their combination
"irresistibly establishes a pattern of 'doing business' '"I in Florida
for purposes of a suit arising out of injuries sustained in an air crash
in Alabama while plaintiff was aboard one of the aircraft owned by
the nonresident corporate defendants.
In two companion cases, both styled Beckham v. Holborn, ° the
District Court of Appeal, First District, ruled that a nonresident
individual and corporate defendant were not subject to service of
process under section 48.181 even though the individual defendant
was found to be a participant in the unlawful sale of unregistered
securities and subject to the remedial provisions of section
517.21(1)."' In these cases, the court affirmed the trial court's find-
ing that there was insufficient evidence to show that the corporate
defendant conducted business or a business venture in Florida with
respect to the sale of its stock to the plaintiff. Thus it held that a
cause of action would not lie against the individual defendant as a
participant who aided the corporate defendant to make the sale.2
Review of the summary facts set forth in the opinion suggests that
the only activity of the corporate defendant in Florida was the sale
of its securities as an issuer. Furthermore, it appears that the court
was impressed by the corporate defendant's acceptance of plaintiff's
check in payment of the stock while in Florida on other business and
delivery of the stock certificate to the plaintiff in Florida, also while
on other business. The court seemed to conclude therefore, that
48. 343 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
49. Id. at 656; accord, Washington Star Syndicate, Inc. v. Wright, 313 So. 2d 444 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1975). The contract, which was the subject of the action, was entered into in Florida,
the products produced in Florida and the nonresident corporate defendant considered itself
a joint venturer in Florida for the purpose of producing the products. See also International
City Bank & Trust Co. v. Forest Shores, Inc., 340 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
50. 330 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976); 332 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976), cert. denied,
345 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 1977).
51. 332 So. 2d at 682-83 (construing FLA. STAT. §§ 48.181 & 517.21(1) (1975)).
52. 330 So. 2d at 102.
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there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's decision
that the plaintiff had not sustained his burden of showing that the
corporate defendant conducted a business or business venture in
Florida .13
In the discussion in both opinions, the factual circumstances
surrounding the conduct of the corporate defendant, as an issuer of
securities, are insufficient to determine the extent of the offering in
Florida. Nevertheless, assuming that the plaintiff was the only of-
feree and/or purchaser of the securities located in Florida and that
all negotiations took place in Florida, then the sale of the stock was
certainly completed upon the payment and delivery of the shares
which admittedly took place in Florida. Therefore, even if the court
found that this isolated sale to a Florida resident by the corporate
defendant through the services of its president (the individual de-
fendant) did not constitute "doing business" in Florida, it would
seem to constitute the sale of personal property by means of an
agent "in this state" within the meaning of section 48.181(3)
thereby subjecting both the agent and his principal to the jurisdic-
tion of the Florida courts." Finally, the opinions of the court in both
cases leave unanswered the interesting question of whether an issuer
may violate the registration provision55 and/or anti-fraud provision 6
of Florida securities law without subjecting itself to service of pro-
cess for doing business in this state under sections 48.181(1) or
48.193(1)(a). While it is conceivable that a court could so rule (and
the District Court of Appeal, First District, seems to have so ruled
in this case), as a practical matter it is inconceivable that a foreign
issuer, who, through corporate agents or broker-dealers, violates the
registration and/or anti-fraud provisions of the Florida securities
law, should not subject itself and its agents to service of process in
Florida pursuant to the. provisions of sections 48.181(1) or
48.193(1) (a)."
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Radlin v. Aero Sys., Inc., 340 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976). Since the
defendant's contracts in Florida were for his pecuniary benefit, the court refused to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction.
55. FLA. STAT. § 517.07 (1977), repealed by 1976 Fla. Laws, ch. 76-168, § 3, effective July
1, 1980.
56. Id. § 517.301, repealed by 1976 Fla. Laws, ch. 76-168, § 3, effective July 1, 1980.
57. The Florida Sale of Securities Law, Id. §§ 517.01-.33, provides that no securities may
be offered or sold "within this state" unless the securities have been registered or an exemp-
tion from registration is available. Id. § 517.07. Furthermore, the anti-fraud provisions of the
act provide that it is a violation of the provisions of the act for any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security "in this state," to engage in certain manipulative and
deceptive practices. Id. § 517.301(1). The question is, therefore, whether an issuer's conduct
can invoke the substantive provisions of the Florida Sale of Securities Law (sell securities
"within" or "in" Florida) without, as a matter of law, operating, conducting, engaging in or
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With respect to the requirement that the nonresident defendant
exercise control over the product or distributor located in Florida,
engrafted on to the statute by case law, the supreme court in AB
CTC v. Morejon" restated its holding in Dinsmore and held that a
nonresident defendant must be shown to exercise control over the
brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors or control over the per-
sonal property in the hands of these persons before that defendant
will be held to be doing business in Florida for purposes of sections
48.181(1) or 48.181(3)." g In this case the corporate defendant, AB
CTC, a Swedish corporation, was the subject of an action by the
plaintiff for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the
negligent manufacture of a washing machine sold by the defendant
to an independent distributor, who in turn sold it to the plaintiff.
In finding that there was insufficient proof to show the requisite
control, the court noted that while "a parent company has 'control'
over a subsidiary, a manufacturer does not necessarily have 'control'
over a sole distributor."' 0 Therefore, absent further proof regarding
control over the product or the distributor, the burden had not been
carried and the cause was dismissed as against the corporate defen-
dant."'
The language of the court noting that "a parent company
ha[d] 'control' over a subsidiary" seems to indicate that, as a mat-
ter of law, where the subsidiary acted as the distributor, broker,
jobber or wholesaler, the parent would be held to have sufficient
control for purposes of subjecting it to long-arm jurisdiction. This
inference was quickly rejected by the District Court of Appeal, First
District, in Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. McCurdy,"2 where the court
held that the fact that the American subsidiary of Volkswagenwerk
was wholly owned by the parent was insufficient, in and of itself, to
overcome the prima facie showing made by the foreign corporate
defendant that it was not otherwise doing business in Florida. The
carrying on a business or business venture in Florida. In Radlin v. Aero Sys., Inc., 340 So. 2d
1260 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976), the district court seemed to indicate that it could not. In Dinsmore
v. Martin Blumenthal Assocs., 314 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1975), the Supreme Court of Florida also
seemed to indicate that an isolated offer and sale to one Florida resident would not constitute
doing business in Florida by the issuer for purposes of §§ 48.181(1) or 48.193(1)(a). The
supreme court, however, left the inference that such activity would subject the issuer and its
"brokers" to service of process on the basis of § 48.181(3). See FLA. STAT. §§ 517.02(4), (5) &
(7) (1977) (defining a dealer, issuer, and broker). In essence, the argument could be made
that, for service of process under § 48.181(3), a broker should include persons who would be
deemed dealers, brokers and issuers under Florida securities law.
58. 324 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1975).
59. Id. at 627.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 340 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
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court stated that only when the plaintiff could show that the parent
corporation exercised such a degree of control over its subsidiary
that the activities of the subsidiary were in fact the activities of the
parent within Florida was substituted service of process by use of
section 48.181 applicable. 3 This decision accords with the prior rul-
ing by the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida in Hitt v. Nissan Motor Co."4 The court there found that the
Japanese parent exercised sufficient control over its American sub-
sidiary in the sale of Datsun automobiles so that the parent was
indeed doing business in Florida for purposes of section 48.181 in
connection with the alleged violations of various federal antitrust
laws.65 In so ruling, the court considered the degree of control exer-
cised in fact by the parent over the subsidiary to be significant; the
exchange of officers and employees between the parent and subsidi-
ary and the common directors of the companies. In addition, the
contractual arrangement between the parent and subsidiary with
respect to the distribution of the parent's motor vehicles was
deemed significant in finding that the parent was doing business in
Florida."6
3. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, reaffirmed in two
cases the principle first announced in Investment Corp. of Florida
v. Buchman7 that, absent (i) conduct which would furnish evidence
leading to an inference of fraud or (ii) a contractual relationship or
its equivalent with the party plaintiff, accountants cannot be held
liable in preparing financial statements even though they are aware
that the financial statements will be used and relied upon by third
parties. Ordinary negligence, absent such a contractual relationship
or its equivalent, is not sufficient to impose liability." First, in
63. Id. at 546.
64. 399 F. Supp. 838 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
65. Id. at 845-46, 850-52.
66. Id. at 845-46. See also International City Bank & Trust Co. v. Forest Shores, Inc.,
340 So. 2d 530, 532-33 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
67. 208 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
68. Id. at 293-96. In the Buchman case the District Court of Appeal, 'Second District,
relied on the holdings of the New York Court of Appeals in State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst,
278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938), and in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche Ross & Co., 255 N.Y.
170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
It should be noted that Buchman did not involve a claim under the Florida securities
law. Therefore, assuming that the negligent preparation of financial statements in connection
with the sale of securities might constitute a violation of FLA. STAT. § 517.301(1) (1977) (see
note 56 supra), the question remains unanswered whether such conduct by the professional
would constitute participation or aiding in making the sale of securities sufficient to establish
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Dubbin v. Touche Ross & Co.,"5 the court held that the stockholders
of a corporation are not third party beneficiaries to the contract for
services between that corporation and its accountants. Specifically,
the court held that the stockholders' efforts to have their securities
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, as an
adjunct to the corporation's application to register securities, did
not make them third party beneficiaries to the contract of profes-
sional service between the accountants and the corporation.70 The
decision in Dubbin was cited with approval in the subsequent case
of Mulligan v. Wallace.7 In Mulligan, the court held that officers,
directors and stockholders of the corporate client as well as former
corporate officers and directors are not third party beneficiaries of
the contract between the corporation and the professionals; absent
some specific evidence supporting a contract or agreement between
the plaintiffs and the accountants, no liability attached to the ac-
countants for errors and mistakes in the annual report prepared by
the accountants as experts and filed with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission.72 None of these cases expands on the rationale
and reasoning of prior case law in Florida and elsewhere. Rather, the
cases can be considered as the most recent progeny of a line of cases
originating with Ultramares Corp. v. Touche Ross & Co. 73
4. PROMOTER'S LIABILITY
As a general rule, the promoter of a corporation is personally
liable on contracts entered into on behalf of the proposed corpora-
liability against the professional under the remedial provisions of § 517.21(1) (see note 55
supra). This section provides:
Every sale made in violation of any of the provisions of this chapter shall be
voidable at the election of the purchaser; and the person making the sale and
every . . . agent of or for the seller, if the . . . agent has personally participated
or aided in any way in making the sale, shall be jointly and severolly liable to
the purchaser ....
Id. (emphasis added).
69. 324 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
70. Id. at 129.
71. 349 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
72. Id. at 746-47; accord, Nortek, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 532 F.2d 1013 (5th
Cir. 1976). In Nortek, the Fifth Circuit specifically relied on the holding of Judge Cardozo in
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche Ross & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 171 N.E. 441 (1931) and State Street
Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E. 2d 416 (1938) as adopted in Investment Corp. v.
Buchman, 208 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
73. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). The New York Court of Appeals held that in a
negligence action brought against accountants to recover losses suffered in reliance upon their
certified audit, accountants will be liable for fraudulent representations. The duty to make
the certificate without fraud extends to investors to whom the accountant's employer exhibits
the certificate. Liability for mere negligence, however, is governed by contract and is to be
enforced between the parties by whom the contract has been made.
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tion, absent a specific understanding that the other party will look
only to the corporation upon formation. The promoter's liability is
said to be original and primary because the promoter, at the time
of the contract, has no principal.74 This general rule was restated
and readopted in the case of Vodopitch v. Collier County Devel-
opers, Inc.: "In our opinion, before the promoter may escape liabil-
ity, it must be shown that the parties agree to bind the corporation
alone."75 The court specifically relied on the prior decision of the
Supreme Court of Florida in Hunt v. Adams,7" in which it was held
that a promoter was not personally liable on a written contract
made for the benefit of an unincorporated charitable society when
the contract on its face clearly indicated that the promoter or repre-
sentative was not to be personally bound.77
5. DIRECTORS' AND MANAGEMENT'S RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
The Florida General Corporation Act provides that the business
and affairs of the corporation are managed under the direction of the
board of directors, acting as a board, and that all corporate power
is exercised by or under the authority of the board.7" The authorities,
duties and responsibilities of the officers are derived from the board
of directors by means of the bylaw provisions or resolutions adopted
by the board establishing the officers.7" Most of the judicial deci-
sions in this area interpreting the rights and responsibilities of offi-
cers and directors were rendered prior to the adoption of the General
Corporation Act which became effective in 1976. Nevertheless, the
prior decisions are generally in accord with the majority positions
of courts of other jurisdictions under similar general corporation
acts.
Directors and officers are deemed to be fiduciaries of the corpo-
ration. Thus, directors' and officers' relationships to the corporation
and its shareholders is one of trust. The standard of conduct to
which directors must conform is set forth in section 607.111(4) of the
Florida Statutes (1977) which provides that "[a] director shall
perform his duties as a director . . . in good faith, in a manner he
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and
with such care as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position
74. 1 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 215 (1974).
75. 319 So. 2d 43, 44 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
76. 111 Fla. 1164, 149 So. 24 (1933).
77. Vodopitch v. Collier County Developers, Inc., 319 So. 2d 43, 45 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
78. See FLA. STAT. § 607.111(1) (1977). For an excellent general discussion of this area
of the law, see R. STRUDLER & I. HEIMBINDER, Officers' and Directors' Responsibilities in
FLORIDA BASIC CORPORATE PRACTICE (1977).
79. FLA. STAT. § 607.151 (1977).
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would use in similar circumstances.""0 As a general rule, the courts
have traditionally viewed the action of the board of directors as
presumptively proper, have permitted wide discretion to the direc-
tors and officers in the exercise of their best business judgment and
will not substitute the judgment of the court for that of the board
or management, provided that judgment of the board has been exer-
cised in good faith for the corporate interest.'
Three cases were decided by the Florida appellate courts during
the survey period with respect to this area of the law. First, in
Recarey v. Rader,8" the District Court of Appeal, Third District,
without reviewing the facts, refused to appoint a receiver for the
management of a hospital corporation on the petition of minority
stockholders. The court stated that the appointment of a receiver
is "drastic relief" which should not be utilized unless "the exigen-
cies of the case demand it and no other protection to the applicants
can be devised by the court. In other words, the appointment of [a]
receiver for a going corporation is a last-resort remedy, and should
not be employed when another adequate remedy is available."83
In contrast to the result in Recarey, which involved an attempt
to unseat management by appointing a receiver, the District Court
of Appeal, Fourth District, in Procacci v. Solomon, 4 permitted a
corporation's president and director to purchase formerly owned
corporate property from a bank which had obtained the property by
foreclosing and purchasing it at the judicial sale. The court held
that absent evidence of conspiracy or some malicious plan between
the director and the bank, the director did not breach any fiduciary
or quasi-fiduciary relationship to the corporation and its stockhold-
ers or otherwise acquire a personal advantage to the detriment of the
corporation or its stockholders. 5 Without citing the case, the court
obviously distinguished the factual situation in Procacci from
News-Journal Corp. v. Gore,6 in which the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida found a breach of an officer's fiduciary duty in purchasing at the
foreclosure sale property of the corporation which was the subject
matter of the foreclosure."
80. Id. § 607.111(4); see Schein v. Caesar's World, Inc., 491 F.2d 17, 20 (5th Cir. 1974).
For an excellent summary of the general state of the law regarding a director's rights and
responsibilities see Subcommittee on Functions & Responsibilities of Directors, Comm. on
Corporate Laws, ABA, Corporate Director's Guidebook, 32 Bus. LAW. 5, 11-39 (1976).
81. See Schein v. Caesar's World, Inc., 491 F.2d 17, 20 (5th Cir. 1974).
82. 320 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
83. Id. at 30.
84. 317 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
85. Id. at 468; accord, City of Miami Beach v. Smith, 551 F.2d 1370, 1376 (5th Cir. 1977).
86. 147 Fla. 217, 2 So. 2d 741 (1941).
87. Procacci may be distinguished from News-Journal on the basis of the importance of
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Iii State ex rel. Blatt v. Panelfab International Corp.,8 the
District Court of Appeal, Third District held that mandamus was
not the appropriate relief for a director89 who, having successfully
defended charges against him and having received a judgment of
acquittal, suffered a refusal by the corporation to indemnify him for
his attorneys' fees and costs. In the absence of any allegation in the
petition that the plaintiff was without adequate legal remedies at
law or in equity, and because it was uncertain whether the charges
resulted from conduct within the scope of plaintiff's duties as-an
officer,"° plaintiff would have to resort to other legal or equitable
relief.'
6. DISREGARDING THE CORPORATE ENTITY
As a general rule, a corporation will be looked upon as a legal
entity until sufficient reason appears to the contrary. When the
legal entity is used to defeat the public convenience, to justify a
wrong, to protect a fraud or to defend a crime, however, the law will
regard the corporation as an association of persons and "pierce the
corporate veil" for the benefit of the public or third persons. Fur-
thermore, if the corporation is the mere alter ego or business conduit
of an individual, the courts will also disregard it for the benefit of
the public and third persons. The alter ego theory was adopted by
the courts to respond to the corporate entity that has been used as
a subterfuge and used to work an injustice. In order to establish the
doctrine, it must be shown that the stockholders disregarded the
corporate entity, making it a mere instrumentality for the transac-
tion of their own affairs; that there is such a unity of interest and
ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation or cor-
porations and the owners no longer exist; and, that to adhere to the
doctrine of corporate entity would. promote injustice or protect a
fraud.93 With respect to a corporate agency or affiliate, the courts
the purchased property to the corporation. In News-Journal, the property purchased by the
officer was of the utmost importance to the welfare of the corporation. The supreme court
found that if the officer had made efforts to purchase the property on behalf of the corpora-
tion, the corporation, would have greatly benefited. In contrast, the property purchased in
Procacci was as inherently necessary to the corporation. See also Etheredge v. Barrow, 102
So. 2d 660, 662 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1958).
88. 314 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
89. Petitioner relied on FLA. STAT. § 608.13 (1975), providing a right of indemnification
for a corporate director who was a defendant in a lawsuit arising from actions committed in
his capacity as director.
90. 314 So. 2d at 196.
91. Id.
92. W. FLETCHER, supra note 74, at § 41 et seq. See also Edwards, Corporate Law and
Securities Regulation, 30 U. MIAMI L. REV. 401, 405-08 (1976).
93. W. FLETCHER, supra note 74, at § 41. See also House of Koscot Dev. Corp. v. Ameri-
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have applied the alter ego theory or mere instrumentality concept
by requiring proof that the controlled corporation has no separate
mind, will or existence of its own, but that it is rather a business
conduit for its principal. Ownership of all or a majority of the stock
of the corporation coupled with common management and direction
does not, however, operate as a merger-of the two entities. Instead,
there must be some showing that the control by one corporation of
another is so complete that the general rules of agency are applica-
ble, and the controlled corporation may be deemed an agent of its
principal."
Two cases recently decided by Florida appellate courts have
applied these general principles without variation. In both cases,
the courts found that the individual stockholders had not used the
corporation for a fraudulent purpose or as their alter ego and that
the parent-subsidiary relationship was sufficiently independent so
that the subsidiary was not a mere instrumentality of the parent.
In the first case, Computer Center, Inc. v. Vedapco, Inc.,95 the court
found the evidence insufficient to establish that the corporate entity
should be disregarded in order to prevent fraud, illegality or injus-
tice, or that the corporation was a mere device or sham used to
mislead creditors. In Vedapco, the corporation was owned by a hus-
band and wife; the assets were sold two months after the plaintiff,
a creditor, filed its action, and the proceeds from the sale of the
assets were used to pay creditors of the corporation with the excep-
tion of the plaintiff and a stockholder who had loaned the corpora-
tion over three million dollars without receiving repayment. The
court noted that the fact that the husband and wife personally
guaranteed the indebtedness on the building purchased by the cor-
poration does not, by itself, constitute a "badge of fraud."" There-
fore, the court ruled that the plaintiff-creditor failed to carry the
burden of proof necessary to warrant disregarding the corporate
entity and refused to fix personal liability on the stockholders."
In the second case, Unijax, Inc. v. Factory Insurance
Association,8 the parent corporation brought an action against the
insurer of its subsidiaries to recover benefits on a business interrup-
tion insurance policy of the subsidiaries for fire loss to a paper mill
can Line Cosmetics, Inc., 468 F.2d 64 (5th Cir. 1972); Aztec Motel, Inc. v. State ex rel.
Faircloth, 251 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1971).
94. See, e.g., House of Koscot Dev. Corp. v. American Line Cosmetics, Inc., 468 F.2d
64, 66-67 (5th Cir. 1972).
95. 320 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
96. Id. at 406-07.
97. Id. at 407.
98. 328 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
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owned by the subsidiaries. After discussing the general rules regard-
ing piercing the corporate veil, the court found that there were three
separate and distinct corporate entities, each of which must main-
tain an action to recover for its loss.9 Inasmuch as the parent and
subsidiaries were incorporated in various states, including Florida,
the court, sub judice, used general common law principles, evident
in decisions from many states, as a guide. In essence, the case pro-
vides a distillate exposition of general case law regarding parent-
subsidiary relationships and, therefore, provides an excellent sum-
mary of this aspect of corporate law.""
. Medley Harwoods, Inc. v. Novy °' provided counsel with an
opportunity to invoke a novel theory of law: the stockholders of a
foreign corporation, not qualified to do business in Florida but
which is doing business, are individually liable for debts incurred
by the corporation in Florida. Counsel advanced the theory citing
in support two supreme court cases decided in 1895 and 1896.'02 The
court held, however, that the reasoning of these cases had been
receded from in 19311"1 and, on the basis of the well-reasoned deci-
sion of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, in Mysels v.
Barry, 04 held that an officer or shareholder of a foreign corporation
cannot be held personally responsible for the debts of the corpora-
tion incurred in Florida solely because the corporation has failed to
qualify to do business in Florida.'05 The court in Mysels perceived
the majority rule of law to be that, in the absence of definite statu-
tory authority, the officers, stockholders, incorporators and other.
persons contracting for, or on behalf of, a noncomplying foreign
corporation cannot be held liable for its debts as partners. The court
based its decision on statutory law then existing in chapter 613 of
the Florida Statutes (1973). The court noted that chapter 613 had
been repealed effective January 1, 1976 and replaced by the Florida
General Corporation Act which, "on the subject of the failure of a
foreign corporation to qualify, does not appear to have been sub-
stantially changed.' '06
99. Id. at 453-54.
100. Id.
101. 346 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
102. Duke v. Taylor, 37 Fla. 64, 19 So. 172 (1896); Taylor v. A. G. Branham & Co., 35
Fla. 297, 17 So. 552 (1895).
103. Herbert H. Pape, Inc. v. Finch, 102 Fla. 425, 136 So. 496 (1931).
104. 332 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
105. 346 So. 2d at 1226.
106. 332 So. 2d at 39-40, n.1. But see FLA. STAT § 607.397 (1977) and compare with FLA.
STAT. §§ 607.304(1), .307 (1977).
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7. RIGHTS OF SHAREHOLDERS
Under the Florida General Corporation Act, a shareholder'17 has
a number of specific rights. Subject to the provisions of the articles
of incorporation and, in certain circumstances, the bylaws, a share-
holder has the right to exercise his vote for all matters on which
shareholders are entitled to vote,' 8 to receive dividends if declared
by the board of directors,10 to inspect the books and records of the
corporation at reasonable times for proper purposes,"0 to receive a
certificate evidencing the shares of the corporation of which he is the
owner,"' to exercise a vote with respect to mergers and consolida-
tions,"' and, upon the sale of the assets of the corporation, or upon
a merger or consolidation, to exercise rights of dissent and ap-
praisal."' Furthermore, the case law provides a shareholder with
certain additional and supplementary rights."4
In Applied Digital Data Systems, Inc. v. Milgo Electronic
Corp., "I the Southern District of New York, applying Florida law,
found that the right of inspection and access to the shareholder list
of a Florida corporation is governed by the Florida General Corpora-
tion Act and is expressly limited to stockholders."' Thus the plain-
tiff corporation, which was making a tender offer to acquire common
stock of the defendant, a Florida corporation, was held not to be
legally entitled to the shareholder list because it was not a stock-
holder. Nevertheless, the district court granted a mandatory injunc-
tion ordering the defendant to turn over this list so that the plaintiff
could directly solicit the stockholders. The court rested its decision
on the view that the federal securities laws expressed a congressional
concern that both the offeror and management have an equal oppor-
tunity to present their cases to the public stockholders who are
107. FLA. STAT. § 607.004(6) (1977) which defines a "shareholder" or "stockholder" as
the holder of record of shares in a corporation.
108. See Id. §§ 607.091, .094, .097, .101, .114 & .117.
109. See Id. § 607.137.
110. See Id. § 607.157.
111. See Id. § 607.067.
112. See Id. § 607.221.
113. See Id. §§ 607.241, .244 & .247.
114. See, e.g., Florida Tel. Corp. v. Peninsular Tel. Co., 111 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1959) (the statutory right of inspectioh of books and records of private corporations given to
stockholders does not abridge the right of the stockholder as it existed at common law to
exercise this prerogative, but rather enlarges and extends the right by removing some of the
common law limitations). This case was decided under preexisting FLA. STAT. ch. 608 and
presumably is still applicable under FLA. STAT. ch. 607 (1977). See also Fussell v. McLendon,
109 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1959); Liebman v. Pinks, 136 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
115. 425 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
116. Id. at 1164.
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confronted by a cash tender offer." 7
In dealing with areas of shareholders' rights to disclosure of
material information in connection with the purchase and sale of
securities, counsel normally looks first to the anti-fraud provisions
of federal and state securities laws. Two cases during the survey
period, however, passed on this issue and reached opposite conclu-
sions without invoking the provisions of either federal or Florida
securities law. In Morton v. Young,"' the plaintiff appealed an ad-
verse judgment in an action for rescission of a contract on the basis
of fraud, alleging that the defendant offered to sell him unregistered
stock in a Florida corporation on the representation that the stock
would be registered no later than approximately a year and one-
half. Plaintiff purchased the shares and over a year later the defen-
dant informed him that the shares would not be registered. The trial
court found that the transaction was at arm's length; that the plain-
tiff did not have the right to rely on the oral promise of the defen-
dant to have the stock registered; that the plaintiff was an experi-
enced businessman, although not an "astute stock manipulator"
who had not consulted the accountants, lawyers and stockbrokers
whom he had available; and, that the plaintiff knew that the defen-
dant was not the majority holder of the stock in the corporation. The
court, therefore, found that the facts did not show either the exist-
ence of a confidential relationship or justifiable reliance on the rep-
resentation of the defendant, and the plaintiff could not invoke the
equitable remedy of rescission based on fraud."9
Morton v. Young presents an excellent summary of Florida de-
cisional law regarding the elements of a cause of action which must
be proved in order to establish the right to rescind a contract when
there is a material misrepresentation of fact or breach of a confiden-
tial relationship between the parties. Furthermore, because the case
is well written and well reasoned, it provides an excellent rationale
on the import and necessity of the anti-fraud provisions of federal
and Florida securities law. 20
117. Id. at 1165. The court attached, as an appendix to its opinion, a letter subsequently
received from the general counsel for the Securities and Exchange Commission regarding an
inquiry whether it was the position of the Securities aqd Exchange Commission that a federal
court may order a company to provide a tender offeror for that company's shares with a list
of the company's shareholders. Essentially, the general counsel indicated that the Commis-
sion was then contemplating amendments to the regulations under the Williams Act by
means of providing a new Rule 14e-1 under section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
which would impose such a requirement on the company. Nevertheless, it was the Commis-
sion's position that the inherent equity powers of the court would allow the court to make
such an order irrespective of the adoption of Rule 14e-1, as proposed.
118. 311 So. 2d 755 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
119. Id. at 756-57.
120. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Byrne, 320 So. 2d 436 (Fla.
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In Watson v. Khachab,12 the court affirmed the entry of a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the following findings of fact
made by the trial court. Plaintiffs were the majority stockholders,
officers and directors of the corporation. On the other hand, defen-
dants were minority stockholders, of which one of them was also an
officer and director. After agreeing to sell the business through a
stock sale, the parties advertised the corporation for sale at a given
price. The defendants, having access to all incoming calls respond-
ing to the advertisement, represented to the plaintiffs that a named
individual had offered to buy the business for a lesser figure. The
attorney handling the sale refused to disclose the names of the prin-
cipals whom the named individual represented. In response to de-
fendants' threats to quit the business unless the sale was confirmed
to the named person on behalf of his undisclosed principals, plain-
tiffs agreed to sell the business to the named purchaser. Subsequent
to the sale, plaintiffs discovered that the defendants were the real
parties in interest and that the named person was merely a straw
party used for the purpose of concealing the true interest of the
defendants in the purchase. Notwithstanding the fact that the
plaintiffs were officers and directors of the corporation and had
knowledge of the value of the corporation's property, the trial court
characterized these facts as a willful and wanton misrepresentation,
made in complete disregard of the rights of the plaintiffs, which
constituted a breach of defendants' trust to the plaintiffs. The court,
therefore, found for the plaintiffs in the amount of their damages.,2
The appellate court affirmed the decision, citing prior cases
dealing with the presumed correctness of the findings of fact and
rulings of law by a trial court. Thus, implicitly the appellate court
found that, on these facts, the plaintiffs had established a case
under the Florida common law of breach of a fiduciary duty and/or
fraud in the inducement. To the extent that a general principle
regarding shareholder rights may be extrapolated, this case may
suggest the possibility that in certain circumstances there could
exist a fiduciary duty of fair and honest dealing between sharehold-
ers in connection with the sale of their shares of capital stock.123
8. SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS
A significant decision was rendered by the Supreme Court of
3d Dist. 1977), and text accompanying notes 247 & 248 infra. But see Freud v. Gross, 345 So.
2d 1097 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
121. 334 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
122. Id. at 79-80.
123. See generally Morton v. Young, 311 So. 2d 755, 756 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
19781
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Florida in Schein v. Chasen, 24 on certification of the following ques-
tion from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit:
Are investors, who sell stock on the basis of inside information
about the issuer corporation which they received from a stock-
holder who in turn received the information from the president
of the issuer corporation liable to the corporation in a shareholder
derivative suit under Florida law for the profits realized by the
investors on the sale of that stock?
125
The court answered the question in the negative, holding and
reaffirming that under Florida case law three conditions precedent
to such an action must exist: (1) the ownership of the shares in the
corporation at the time the wrong was committed;'26 (2) the direc-
tors' unjustified refusal, on plaintiff's demand, to bring suit in the
corporation's behalf; 17 and (3) damage to the corporation.
2
1
Three specific aspects of the case, however, bear comment.
First, as dicta, the court indicated that it would "not choose to
adopt the innovative ruling"'' 21 of the New York Court of Appeals in
Diamond v. Oreamunoa' which, applying New York corporate law,
held that officers and directors of a corporation may be held ac-
countable to their corporation for gains realized by them from trans-
actions in the company's stock as a result of their use of material
inside information. In essence, the court in Diamond found that
there was a fiduciary duty owed by corporate officials to the corpora-
tion to maintain corporate information in confidence as a corporate
asset.' 3 ' As noted by the court, the application of the rule in
Diamond to the facts in this case would have required an extension
of that holding to persons other than officers and directors and
specifically would have required the court to find that a similar
124. 313 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1975) (cited in Schein v. Chasen, 519 F. 2d 453 (2d Cir. 1975)).
For a detailed commentary on this case and a discussion of the interplay between state
corporate law and the insider trading provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 see
Comment, Corporations: Florida Common Law Liability of Tippees in a Shareholders'Deriv-
ative Suit, 28 U. FLA. L. REv. 223 (1975).
125. 519 F.2d 453, 454-55 (2d Cir. 1975). The Second Circuit also certified the question
whether the stockbroker who relayed the material information from the president to the
investors would be jointly and severally liable with them for the profits they would realize in
a shareholders' derivative suit. See 313 So. 2d at 739-40. By virtue of the court's expansive
holding, this question was also answered in the negative without the necessity of a direct
statement.
126. See News-Journal Corp. v. Gore, 147 Fla. 217, 2 So. 2d 741 (1941).
127. See Talcott v. McDowell, 148 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
128. See Orlando Orange Groves Co. v. Hale, 119 Fla. 159, 161 So. 284 (1935).
129. 313 So. 2d at 746.
130. 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
131. 313 So. 2d at 744 (citing with approval Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir.
1973) (Kaufman, J., dissenting)).
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fiduciary duty exists and is owned by stockholders to their corpora-
tion.'32 The dicta is an unfortunate gratuity since the court appar-
ently had previously adopted principles of liability similar to those
enunciated in Diamond. Underlying the rejection of Diamond in the
instant case is the court's strong adherence to the principle "that
actual damage to the corporation must be alleged in the complaint
to substantiate a stockholder's derivative action." '133 Perhaps in an
appropriate case, a cause of action could be sustained if special
corporate damages are alleged in the derivative action against an
officer or director who has utilized confidential information for his
own profit and/or the corporation's damage. This position finds spe-
cial support in the opinion of Justice England who concurred spe-
cially with the majority." 4 In addition, the extensive quotation of
the court from the reasoning of Judge Kaufman indicates that the
court might rule that a derivative cause of action exists on behalf
of the corporation in a case where an officer or director of the corpo-
ration uses confidential corporate information for his own enrich-
ment at the insistence of or in conspiracy with a third party. Judge
Kaufman specifically recognized the existence of such a cause of
action based on section 312 of the American Law Institute's Restate-
ment (Second) of Agency. 5 Nevertheless, the court will probably
require the proof of special damage to the corporation.
Finally, the general tenor of the decision, and especially the
extensive quotation of Judge Kaufman's remarks, seem to indicate
that the court in the future will not extend substantive or procedural
Florida decisional or statutory law in order to parallel the provisions
of federal securities law. 3 ' What is left unresolved is the liberality
with which the court will apply the remedial provisions of Florida
securities law for the benefit of investors. Given the court's com-
ment in Schein, declining to engage in "unprecedented expansive
reading" of case law in order to achieve a recognized salutary benefit
such as prohibiting trading on inside information, it would seem
that the court will not be very "expansive" in this area either.'37
132. Id. at 746.
133. Id.
134. Rather than expressly reject the principle of Diamond, as did the majority, Justice
England argued: "I would answer both certified questions in the negative on the narrow
grounds (i) that Florida law requires an allegation of corporate damage as a predicate to
maintenance of a shareholder's derivative suit, and (ii) that an action for civil damages must
allege more than merely speculative damages." Id. at 747-48. See also Renpack, Inc. v.
Oppenheimer, 104 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1958).
135. 313 So. 2d at 745. -
136. Id. at 746 n.2.
137. Id. at 743. The opinion cited with approval the following remarks of Judge Kauf-
man:
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Perhaps this case will become a classic example of the old adage
that hard facts indeed make bad law, Judge Kaufman's reasoning
to the contrary notwithstanding. 38
9. SHARES AND CERTIFICATES
Subject to the regulatory provisions of federal and Florida se-
curities laws, the basic law regulating the issuance of shares of capi-
tal stock in a Florida corporation, the after-market trading and sale
of the shares and delivery of the certificates evidencing the shares
is governed by the interplay between the Florida General Corpora-
tion Act' 39 and Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code as
adopted in Florida. 40 The certificate itself is the instrument or docu-
ment which constitutes evidence of the shareholders' proprietary
interest in the corporation.' While it may not be necessary to issue
a certificate in order to establish that the proprietary interest of the
shareholder exists, the sale does not take place until the certificate
is actually delivered.' Moreover, before the shareholder is recorded
in the books of the corporation, he has no right to exercise franchises
granted to shareholders by virtue of stock ownership.' Further-
more, the kind of consideration and the value of it which may be
accepted by the issuer for an orginal issue of shares is statutorily
provided. "
In Lundquist v. Gulfshore Television Corp.,'4 the court held
that a corporation was precluded by estoppel and/or acquiescence
from asserting that stock was illegally issued inter se the parties.
The court found that the corporation had submitted documents to
a federal agency attesting that the stockholder was the majority
stockholder, and as a result, the federal agency had issued an oper-
In my view, it is no longer debatable that trading on inside information merits
universal condemnation. The undesirable nature of "inside trading" is reflected
in the prophylactic provisions of Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and the more general antifraud principles of Section 10(b) of that Act ....
But the adage that hard facts make bad law is about to come true here, despite
• . . Justice Cardozo's warning that judges are not free agents roaming at will to
create law to fit the facts.
Id.
138. Id.
139. FLA. STAT. §§ 607.001-.414 (1977).
140. Id. §§ 678.101-.406. See also Mann, Investment Securities, 32 Bus. LAW. 1121
(1977).
141. See FLA. STAT. § 607.067 (1977). See also Baywood Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Kennedy,
295 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
142. See FLA. STAT. §§ 678.301(1) & .313(1)(a) (1977).
143. See id. §§ 607.004(6), .067(1) & .091(1).
144. Id. § 607.054; see note 7 supra.
145. 328 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
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ating license in reliance on the corporate representations regarding
ownership. Although there was an issue as to whether the stock had
been lawfully issued for a promissory note because of a certain pro-
vision in the articles of incorporation and lack of official action by
the board of directors, the court did not find this persuasive, espe-
cially in view of the acceptance by the corporation of payments on
the note.'
In the event of a breach of a contract to sell common stock,
specific performance is not a proper remedy unless the market value
of the stock is not easily ascertainable or the stock is not freely
tradable in the market so that it may be readily replaced.'47 In Camp
v. Parks, , however, the court found that where the contract for sale
of a closed corporation's stock was dependent on the active partici-
pation of the corporation which was impossible to secure because of
personal antagonisms between the officers, and where the corpora-
tion was not a party to the agreement, specific performance of the
contract was an inappropriate remedy. Thus, the plaintiff had to
seek money damages even though he might not be able to readily
establish a fair market value for the stock."'
In Florida Boca Raton Housing Association v. Malone,"' the
District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that there was no
legal basis for a court to order an issuer to reissue a new stock
certificate when the old certificate was outside the jurisdiction of
the court. The court had been requested to grant such relief in order
to satisfy a judgment creditor's unsuccessful attempted levy on the
stock certificate owned by the stockholder judgment debtor.,
In an analogous situation, the Sixth Circuit, in Wilkie v.
Brooks,'52 applied Florida law and passed on the rights of a secured
creditor with respect to a certificate of stock issued by a Florida
corporation. First, the court ruled that Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code as adopted in Florida,' was merely a codification
of prior case law, and that in order to perfect a security interest in
a stock certificate, endorsement of the certificate and delivery of
possession to the secured party was all that was required.' In addi-
tion, the court noted that if one of the certificates delivered to the
146. Id. at 203-04.
147. Jackson Land Co. v. Harbeson, 153 So. 2d 826, 827 (Fla. 1963).
148. 314 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
149. Id. at 613-14.
150. 325 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
151. Id. at 23.
152. 515 F.2d 741 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 996 (1975).
153. FLA. STAT. §§ 679.101-.507 (1975).
154. 515 F.2d at 745.
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secured party bore the forged signature of the secretary, then under
Florida law the certificate would be invalid and not subject to a
perfected security interest. '55 This would not affect, however, the
security interest that the secured party had in the validly executed
and endorsed certificates.'56 The interplay of the rulings of the dis-
trict court in Malone and the circuit court in Wilkie reinforces the
strong presumption with respect to ownership of stock certificates.
Finally, in Ford v. Cannon,"'5 a case of first impression, a fed-
eral district court was faced with a claim for relief founded under
the provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Article 8
of the Uniform Commercial Code. Plaintiff had lent money to a
third party who had pledged to the lender unregistered stock which
had not been "lettered" in accordance with the rules of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission. Lettering the stock restricts the
ability of the debtor to pledge the securities and the ability of the
lender to resell them in the event of a default. The lender sued his
debtor's transferor for violation of the warranty contained in section
8-306(2)(c)'55 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which provides that
a "person by transferring a security to a purchaser for value war-
rants only that. . . he knows no fact which might impair the valid-
ity of the security." Even though there was some evidence that the
lender independently knew that the stock was not freely tradable,
the court found that the lender was not the purchaser contemplated
by the statute as the one who would receive the benefit of the war-
ranty as against the defendant. Specifically, the court found that in
other areas under the Uniform Commercial Code, where a warranty
had been extended beyond the immediate person having contrac-
tual or other direct commercial privity with the one sought to be
held liable, the extent of the warranty's reach had been stated.'5"
155. Id. at 747; see FLA. STAT. § 608.41 (1977).
156. 515 F.2d at 747. Compare FLA. STAT. § 608.41(1)(a) (1977) with FLA. STAT. §
607.067(1) (1977).
157. 413 F. Supp. 1393 (M.D. Fla. 1976) (discussed in Mann, supra note 140, at 1130).
158. FLA. STAT. § 678.306(2)(c) (1975).
159. 413 F. Supp. at 1398. It is interesting to note that the court in this case found that
the original transferor had not fully informed the transferee-debtor of the restricted nature
of the stock. The Securities and Exchange Commission contends that such an act constitutes
a prima facie violation of Rule 10b-5 which was promulgated under section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Sec. Act Rel. No. 5226 (Jan. 10, 1972), FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 2785. The court seemed to overlook this release in its discussion of the merits of the
10b-5 claim. 413 F. Supp. at 1397. Assuming the use of an instrumentality of interstate
commerce, the transferee-debtor would have a cause of action under 10b-5 against the
defendant-transferor for rescission on the basis of the Commission's release; and the plaintiff-
lender, on the basis of the substantive provisions of Article 8 of the UCC, would have suc-
ceeded to that claim if he had no notice of the restriction.
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10. VOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION
Under the Florida General Corporation Act, a voluntary disso-
lution of an ongoing corporation may be accomplished by consent
of the shareholders" or by resolution of the directors as affirmed by
the shareholders' vote.'' Following the vote, the corporation delivers
the articles of dissolution to the Department of State. When the
Department of State is satisfied that the articles conform with law,
the Department files the articles and the corporation ceases.',' The
articles may not be filed until all liabilities and obligations of the
corporation have been paid or discharged or adequate provision has
been made therefor and all of the remaining property and assets of
the corporation have been distributed to its shareholders according
to their respective rights and interests."3 The directors of the corpo-
ration at the time of its dissolution constitute a board of trustees for
any property owned or acquired by the dissolved corporation. The
trustees have the power to convey any property or interest remain-
ing in or acquired by the corporation after dissolution. The trustees
are required to utilize any such property for the payment of any
corporate debts, liabilities or obligations known to them, and if
there are none, they are required to distribute the property or the
proceeds from the sale of the property to the persons who were
shareholders of the corporation at the time of dissolution.',
In United States Fire Insurance v. Morejon,"5 a case arising
under chapter 608 of the Florida Statutes (repealed), the court af-
firmed the entry of a judgment against an individual who was an
officer, director and sole stockholder of a dissolved Florida corpora-
tion in favor of a judgment creditor who had obtained the judgment
prior to the dissolution of the corporate judgment debtor and who
had not been paid. Citing section 608.30 of the Florida Statutes
(1975), the court stated that it could find no error in the trial court's
entry of a judgment against the individual because he had liquida-
ted the corporation and had received all of the assets as the sole
stockholder. Furthermore, the court noted that, as a surviving
160. FLA. STAT. §§ 607.254, .257, .261, .264 & .267 (1977). See also James Talcott, Inc.
v. Crown Indus., Inc., 323 So. 2d 311, 314 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
161. FLA. STAT. § 607.257 (1977).
162. Id. § 607.267(2)-(3). In Talcott, the court held that once the decision had been made
to "liquidate the corporation and wind up its business," then the corporation was insolvent
within the meaning of § 608.55 (1975). There is no comparable section in the Florida General
Corporation Act to the repealed § 608.55 (1975) prohibiting transfers in contemplation of
insolvency.
163. FLA. STAT. § 607.267(1) (1977).
164. Id. §§ 607.301(1)-(2).
165. 338 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
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director, the individual was required as a trustee to maintain and
manage an amount of assets sufficient to satisfy creditors' claims. 6'
The decision of the court does not specify whether the individ-
ual was held liable because he was the sole stockholder and received
the assets, or because he was a surviving director who was charged
with managing the fund for the interests of the creditors. Under the
repealed statute,' a trustee is charged with "a personal obligation
to distribute assets first to creditors and second to stockholders."
However, the corresponding section of the Florida General Corpora-
tion Act, Florida Statutes section 607.301 (1977), does not have
comparable language to that found in the repealed statute. There-
fore, under the new act there exists an open question as to whether
the director-trustee in dissolution is personally liable for a failure to
satisfy a corporate debt, liability or obligation which is known to
him. Similarly, chapter 607, in light of the Morejon opinion, leaves
open the question of the liability of a sole stockholder who has
received all the assets of a dissolved corporation in lieu of satisfac-




The Florida Sale of Securities Law is contained in chapter 517
of the Florida Statutes (1977). Under the "Sunset Law" passed in
the 1976 session of the legislature, the chapter is subject to repeal
effective July 1, 1980.118
During the 1977 session of the legislature, two revisers' bills
were passed, the purposes of which were to correct grammatical and
typographical errors in sections 517.11 and 517.12(4) of the Florida
Statutes (1975). The revisions in section 517.11 restructured the
section for clarity and to facilitate correct interpretation. The revi-
sions of section 517.12(4) were drafted to conform the section to
amendments made to other sections of the act when the bond re-
quired of a dealer was increased from $5,000 to $50,000 during the
1975 session of the legislature. ' In addition, section 20.12(2) of the
166. Id. at 224.
167. FLA. STAT. § 608.30(5) (1975) (repealed).
168. 1976 Fla. Laws, ch. 76-168, § 3.
169. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-104, § 194. See also the revisers' notes to the 1977 supplement
to the Florida Statutes.
Prior to the amendment, the Division of Securitie's required investment advisors to post
only a $5,000 bond. The basis for this decision was an attorney general's opinion which
attempted to make some sense of the conflicting provisions of FLA. STAT. §§ 517.12(4), .13-
[Vol. 32:931
CORPORATE LAW AND SECURITIES
Florida Statutes (1975) regarding denials of applications to register
securities was amended, transferred and renumbered as section
517.0901.170
In the 1977 session, the Florida legislature enacted tender offer
legislation entitled the Investor Protection Act which took effect
October 1, 1977. ' The Act applies to tender offers, defined as "an
offer, other than an exempt offer, to acquire any equity security of
an offeree company or a request or invitation for tenders,"'' 2 if after
the acquisition the offeror is the beneficial holder of ten percent or
more of the offeree's outstanding equity securities which were the
subject of the offer.' Those transactions which are deemed to be
exempt offers include: (1) an offer to acquire equity securities which
would not exceed two percent of the class of the securities subject
to acquisition in any twelve-month period; (2) an offer made by a
corporation to acquire its own equity securities; (3) an offer to ac-
quire equity securities of a class not registered under section 12 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; (4) an offer to acquire equity
securities in an unsolicited broker's transaction; and (5) an offer
which the Division of Securities exempts from the provisions of the
Act as one not entered into for the purpose of and not having the
.15 (1973). [1974] FLA. Arr'y GEN. REP. 619. In essence, the Attorney General opined that
an investment advisor, although a statutory dealer, was not a dealer in securities and there-
fore needed to file only a $5,000 bond pursuant to § 517.12(4), while dealers in securities were
required to file a $50,000 bond pursuant to § 517.15.
Since the amendment, the Division of Securities has been requiring investment advisors
in addition to other dealers, including issuers, to file a $50,000 bond on the basis that an
investment advisor is specifically defined as a statutory dealer. An issuer is considered to offer
and sell securities as a principal and, therefore, is also a statutory dealer. See FLA. STAT. §
517.02(4) (1977). Although there is no case law supporting the author's position, an argument
may be made that an issuer, at least, is not a dealer for purposes of §§ 517.12-.15 on either of
two theories: first, an issuer is not explicitly included in the definition of a dealer as is an
investment advisor; second, the references in §§ 517.12(1)-(10) to a dealer are in a context
which does not indicate that the term "dealer" includes an issuer. ("When used in this
chapter, the following terms shall, unless the text otherwise indicates, have the following
respective meanings .... ") (emphasis added). See id. § 517.02. Unfortunately, when an
issuer is "in registration" time does not permit counsel the luxury of litigating the issue with
the Division of Securities.
170. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-106,
171. Id. ch. 77-441, as amended by id. ch. 77-450. As of the date of this article, approxi-
mately 33 states have enacted takeover or tender offer legislation as a supplement to their
general corporation act or their securities regulation law. At the time of the proposal of the
Florida Investor Protection Act, 26 states had enacted such legislation. As codified, the act
appears in FLA. STAT. §§ 517.35-.363 (1977).
172. FLA. STAT. § 517.351(13) (1977). Presumably the scope of the legislation extends to
all tender offers made to a person "in this state." See id. § 517.353(1). In addition, the act
seems to extend to an offer for securities of a corporation incorporated in Florida even if such
a corporation had no stockholders located or resident in Florida. See id. § 517.355(1).
173. Id. § 517.351(5).
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effect of changing or influencing the control of the offeree com-
pany. 
74
If not exempt, an offeror is required to file with the Division of
Securities and with the offeree's registered agent in Florida copies
of the information required by the Williams Act 7 1 "at the time of
making" the tender offer.'76 The Act requires that: (1) the substan-
tive provisions of the offer must be the same to all holders of the
offeree company's equity securities whether the holders are located
or resident in Florida or another state, and the offer must remain
open for at least thirty days; (2) a tendering stockholder is permit-
ted to withdraw his deposit of securities at any time within the first
fifteen days of the offer and at any time after sixty days from the
tender offer; and (3) where the offer is made for less than all of the
securities, and more securities are deposited than the offeror is
bound or willing to take up, then the offeror is required to take up
the securities, pro rata, according to the number deposited by each
offeree. In addition, if the offeror varies the terms of the offer by
increasing the price, the offeror is required to pay the increased price
to all accepting offerees irrespective of when the securities were
tendered. 77 Recommendations by management to accept or reject
the offer must be filed with the Division of Securities (but appar-
ently not with the registered agent of the target company) "not later
than the time" that the recommendations were first published or
sent to the stockholders.'
78
The Act provides for civil liability as against the tender offeror,
participants and aiders and abettors who violate the provisions of
the Act (subject to due diligence defenses) for rescission or damages
in the event the offeror no longer owns the securities. An action must
be commenced within two years "after the transaction upon which
it is based." However, if the offeror has made a written offer to
rescind the transaction and the offeree has failed to accept the offer
within thirty days of its receipt, the offeree may not maintain the
suit.' 7 In addition to the private enforcement remedies contained in
the Act, the Division of Securities is given the authority to seek an
174. Id.
175. The Williams Act is an amendment to §§ 13 & 14 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m-78n (1970). The information now required to be furnished to the
stockholders of the target company and filed with the Securities. and Exchange Commission
is called for in Regulation 14D and Schedule 14D.
176. FLA. STAT. § 517.355(1) (1977).
177. Id. § 517.353.
178. Id. § 517.357. Nevertheless, the author would recommend the filing of the informa-
tion with the registered agent so as to facilitate distribution to stockholders or to facilitate
public access to the information through that office.
179. Id. § 157.359.
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injunction to prohibit a violation of and to enforce compliance with
the Act.1'0 Furthermore, the Division is granted rule making power
with respect to the administration and enforcement of the provi-
sions of the Act.'
5
Florida's Investor Protection Act, modeled on Colorado's Act,, 2
is based largely upon the report of the Subcommitee on Proxy Solic-
itations and Tender Offers of the Federal Regulation of Securities





It has not been and is not now the policy of the Division of
Securities to issue what the securities bar has known as "no action
letters," that is, written interpretations of either the substantive
provisions of the Florida Sale of Securities Law or the regulations
issued thereunder. Nevertheless, the Division has historically made
its opinions known with respect to certain provisions of the statute
and the regulations in conversations between counsel and the staff
of the Division.
Traditionally, it had been the position of the staff of the Divi-
sion that the number of offerees and purchasers set forth in the
exemption from registration afforded by section 517.06(11) of the
Florida Statutes (1977) should be interpreted to mean twenty per-
sons in total irrespective of the state or jurisdiction of their resi-
dency. In May, 1977, the staff reversed its position and informed
counsel that the twenty-person limitation set forth in this section
meant twenty persons resident or otherwise located in Florida. The
Division would, therefore, no longer take action against an issuer or
dealer participating in an unregistered offering in which more than
twenty persons were solicited or sold securities, provided that no
more than twenty persons resident or otherwise located in Florida
were solicited or sold securities. Section 517.06(11) had not been
amended to warrant this change of opinion. The change is internally
motivated and is apparently based on a perception that the prior
interpretation gave unjustified and illegal extraterritorial effect to
180. Id. § 517.361.
181. Id. § 517.363.
182. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 11-15.5 et seq. (1975).
183. See Subcommittee on Proxy Solicitations & Tender Offers, Fed. Regulation of Sec.
Comm., ABA, State Take Over Statutes and the Williams Act, 32 Bus. LAW. 187 (1976). For
an excellent discussion of state tender offer and takeover legislation, see Langvoort, State
Tender-Offer Legislation: Interests, Effects, and Political Compentency, 62 CORNELL L. REV.
213 (1977); Wilner & Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and Their Constitu-
tionality, 45 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1 (1976).
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transactions not occurring within the State of Florida.'84 While ei-
ther interpretation may be correct, the issue has not been addressed
in any reported decision to date. In the absence of either regulations
regarding the Division's present opinion, an appropriate amend-
ment to the statute or a definitive case interpreting the statute,
counsel can take little comfort in the Division's oral interpretation.
While no rules or regulations have been promulgated under the
Investor Protection Act, it is anticipated that by the summer of 1978
rules and regulations will be available for public comment and
adoption by the Division. It is the present oral opinion of the staff
of the Division, however, that the Investor Protection Act applies to
all statutory nonexempt "tender offers," including a negotiated sale
of control securities by a person or group of persons to another
person or group of persons.' Furthermore, the staff contends that
while such a sale of securities may not be considered a customary
"tender offer," it is a statutory "tender offer" for purposes of the
Act.' The draftsman of the Act has indicated, 7 however, that it
184. But see [1955-1956] FLA. Arr'y GEN. BIENMAL REP. 659, 660. In this opinion, the
Attorney General noted that the Florida Securities Act could not be given extraterritorial
effect so as to apply to a sale of securities consummated in another state. The statute,
however, is also directed against negotiations and solicitations within the state and if these
occur a violation of the Act will occur even though the sale has not been consummated in
the state. But cf. Dokken v. Minnesota-Ohio Oil Corp., 201 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
The original Florida Sale of Securities Law was adopted in 1931 but did not contain an
exemption comparable to § 517.06(11). In 1935, however, the Act was amended to provide
an exemption from registration for the following transactions: "The sale of its shares by a
corporation organized under the laws of this state when the total number of shareholders does
not and will not after such sale exceed twenty . 1935 Fla. Laws, ch. 17253 (emphasis
added).
Subsequent to 1935, a number of revisions were made so that the Act now provides an
exemption from the registration provisions of § 517.07 for the following transaction: "The sale
of its securities by a corporation, partnership or trust during any period of twelve consecutive
months to not more than 20 persons .... " FLA. STAT. § 517.06(11) (1977).
The legislative purpose underlying § 517.06(11) was apparently to provide an exemption
for certain smaller business entities: closely-held corporations, partnerships and trusts. If
indeed this is the proper interpretation, then it follows that 20 persons means 20 in total,
rather than 20 resident within the state. Under the latter interpretation, for example, any
corporation could make a public offering of its equity securities as long as only 20 persons in
Florida were solicited and sold such securities and the offering met the other provisions of
the exemption.
On the other hand, the Uniform Securities Act, § 402(b)(9), provides an exemption from
registration for sale to a certain number of persons with the phrase "in this state" expressly
stated. All of the states which have enacted the Uniform Securities Act have adopted this
exemption (with variations in numbers) and have included the phrase "in this state" in the
language of the section. Therefore, it can be maintained that if the legislature had intended
that the computation be limited to persons resident or otherwise located "in this state" it
would have expressly so stated as did the draftsmen of the comparable provision of the
Uniform Securities Act.
185. See the definition of a tender offer set forth in FLA. STAT. § 517.315(13) (1977).
186. See id. § 517.351(5)(e). This section provides that the Division by order may exempt
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was not contemplated that the Act would include privately negoti-
ated sales of equity securities, inasmuch as the term "tender offer"
has been defined in federal cases under the Williams Act as not
including privately negotiated purchases from a limited number of
securities holders. 188 Furthermore, tender offer or takeover legisla-
tion at the state level has not been in response to a perceived need
to regulate any truly negotiated private transactions but, rather,
those transactions which are the antithesis of a privately negotiated
transaction: the blitzkrieg takeover by a corporate raider. '8
Including a negotiated transaction, which is otherwise not ex-
empt from the provisions of the Investor Protection Act, as a statu-
tory tender offer would have widespread and devastating impact on
such transactions. Such an interpretation would prohibit the pri-
vately negotiated sale of control securities by a person or group of
persons to an acquiring company by virtue of the provisions of sec-
tion 517.353 of the Florida Statutes (1977). These provisions of the
Act provide that no offeror (the acquiring company) may make a
tender offer (negotiate an acquisition of control securities) which is
not made to all holders of the securities to be acquired on substan-
tially the same terms. Furthermore, to the extent that the offeror
(acquiring company) receives tenders in excess of the number which
it is bound or willing to take, it must accept on a pro rata basis those
securities tendered.,
C. Prospective Legislation
Presently, the Division of Securities is proposing revisions and
amendments to the Florida Sale of Securities Law. It is anticipated
that discussions between the staff of the Division, industry repre-
sentatives and representatives of the Florida Bar will continue with
a view toward presenting either proposed amendments or a com-
plete revision of this law in the 1978 session of the legislature. Since
Professor James S. Mofsky of the University of Miami School of Law
from the provisions of the Act any transaction which does not have as its effect the purpose
of changing or influencing the control of the target company. The exemption does not contem-
plate a "tender offer" in the classic sense of the term but rather contemplates that a "tender
offer" is any transaction which results in a change of control of the acquired company.
187. See Letter from James W. Beasley to Representative Paul B. Steinberg (April 1,
1977) (on file U. MIAMI L. REV.).
188. See, e.g., GAF v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 720 (2d Cir. 1971); D-Z Investment Co. v.
Holloway, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,771 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
Nachman Corp. v. Halfred, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
94,455 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Water & Wall Assocs., Inc. v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., [1973
Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) 93,943 (D.N.J. 1973); cf. Cattlemen's Inv. Co.
v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
189, See Letter, supra note 187.
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first brought to light the dire need for statutory revision, a number
of proposed revisions and amendments to the Act have been submit-
ted not only by Professor Mofsky, but by the Division of Securities.
To date, however, the Division, the industry and the Florida Bar
have not been able to arrive at a suitable compromise; nor have they
worked together in a joint drafting committee such as that utilized
in Georgia in 1973, which resulted in the adoption of a complete,
logically organized and modern security law for that state. It is
hoped that the 1978 session of the legislature will see the adoption
of significant changes to the present act as a culmination of Profes-
sor Mofsky's initiative.
Of more limited impact to Florida securities regulation is the
completion of the American Law Institute's proposed Federal Se-
curities Code under the leadership of Professor Louis Loss of Har-
vard University.'9 ° At the sixtieth annual conference of the North
American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) in Octo-
ber, 1977, the NASAA went on record as supporting the enactment
of the code as proposed by Congress. If and when Congress adopts
the proposed code, a complete revision of state securities regulation
laws probably will be required.
D. Recent Decisions
1. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE JURISDICTION
Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended,
provides that the federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction
of violations of the Act or the rules and regulations promulgated
thereunder and of all suits in equity and actions in law brought to
enforce any liability or duty created by the Act, its rules or regula-
tions.'' In addition, section 28(a) provides that nothing in the Act
is intended to affect the jurisdiction of state securities regulatory
authorities insofar as such jurisdiction over any security or any per-
son "does not conflict with provisions of this chapter or the rules and
regulations thereunder."' 92
The foregoing provisions have provided the basis for two deci-
sions during the survey period which may have a significant impact
on the Florida Sale of Securities Law and the Investor Protection
190. For a recent symposium discussion of the provisions of the Code, see American Law
Institute's Proposed Federal Securities Code, 30 VAND. L. REv. 311 (1977).
191. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976).
192. Id. § 78bb(a). In comparison, § 18 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77r
(1976), provides that nothing in the Securities Act of 1933 will affect the jurisdiction of any
state securities regulatory agency over any security or person.
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Act. In Community National Bank & Trust Co. v. Vigman,'93 the
plaintiff filed an action alleging violations of margin limitations and
credit restrictions imposed by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Regulations T and U).' 94 The complaint was dismissed by the state
trial court with leave to amend. Thereupon, plaintiff amended his
complaint seeking to avoid a finding that his cause of action arose
under or was to enforce a liability or duty created by the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and the attendant regulations. The trial court
granted the motion to dismiss the amended complaint with leave to
file a second amended complaint. The second amended complaint
was filed and the motions to dismiss, which were refiled on the same
grounds, were denied. The defendants appealed from the denial of
the motions to dismiss.'"
The second amended complaint alleged that: (1) the loans were
arranged through the broker with the bank for the purpose of pur-
chasing securities which were used as collateral for the loans; (2)
such activities are not customary and ordinary; (3) because of a
decline in value of the collateralized securities the plaintiff suffered
loss; (4) such activities constituted a fraud on the plaintiff by the
defendants; and (5) the broker stood in a fiduciary relationship to
the plaintiff and, for the alleged purpose of promoting increased
trading to create commissions ("churning"), was negligent in rec-
ommending the purchase of the securities. Plaintiff demanded re-
scission pursuant to the provisions of section 517.21(1) of the Florida
Statutes (1975) but made no offer to tender the securities.' 6
The court opined that the determinative question regarding the
existence or nonexistence of jurisdiction was whether the substance
of the second amended complaint alleged a violation of the provi-
sions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and its regulations
relating to excessive credit and margin in stock purchases, irrespec-
tive of how the plaintiff pled the case.'91 If in fact the plaintiff was
alleging a breach of duties imposed on the defendants by virtue of
this Act and the regulations thereunder, then the state court was
without subject matter jurisdiction by virtue of the provisions of
section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934'"1 and section
517.25 of the Florida Statutes (1975).'1"
193. 330 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
194. 12 C.F.R. §§ 220-21 (1977).
195. 330 So. 2d at 213-14.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976).
199. 330 So. 2d at 214-15.
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Independently of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the court
analyzed the allegations and found that no violation of law had
occurred regarding the loans by the bank in furtherance of its nor-
mal business, the allegations against the broker concerning churn-
ing and failure to warrant the future market action of the securities,
and the extension of excessive credit for stock purchases by the
broker to his customer. 2 0 Accordingly, the court found that, apart
from the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the plaintiff had failed
to state a cause of action. The court concluded that as to plaintiff's
assertions that the transactions involving excessive credit or under-
collateralized loans made by the bank for the purchase of securities
constituted a cause of action against the bank under the Florida
Sale of Securities Law, "there would be no jurisdiction therefor in
the state court, because it would be in conflict with the federal law
whereby action therefor is maintainable only in the federal
courts."
201
The court's reasoning and opinion in Vigman is quite per-
suasive to the extent that it finds that a state court cannot create
subject matter jurisdiction where none exists and where federal stat-
utes have exclusively reserved such jurisdiction to federal courts.
Furthermore, the court's holding that Congress has preempted the
field of credit regulation and margin requirements regarding the
purchase of certain securities is economically supportable and le-
gally justifiable.
The court noted that the allegation that the broker "churned"
the account of the plaintiff "had reference to a matter which would
be a violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the jurisdic-
tion for action upon which would be in the United States district
courts. '2 02 An allegation of churning would constitute a violation of
the Securities Exchange Act on the basis of a violation of rule 10b-
5 , 3 the language of which is almost identical with the provisions of
section 517.301 of the Florida Statutes (1975).204 Therefore, the
court, sub judice, either held that "churning:" (1) does not consti-
tute a violation of section 517.301(1)(c) of the Florida Statutes
200. Id. at 215-16.
201. Id. at 216.
202. Id.
203. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977).
204. See, e.g., Stromillo v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 396
(E.D.N.Y. 1971). Compare 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977) with FLA. STAT. § 517.301(1)(c)
(1977). Both the rule and the statute provide that in connection with the purchase and sale
of a security it is unlawful to engage in "any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person." Accord, 17 C.F.R. §
240.15cl-2 (1977). See also id. § 240.10b-3(a) & .10b-16(a).
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(1975); (2) does constitute a violation of this section but has been
preempted by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; or (3) does con-
stitute a violation of this section but the plaintiff, having failed to
tender the securities or otherwise offer to return the parties to the
status quo, failed to make a material allegation required by section
517.21(1)1 of the Florida Statutes (1975). If the second theory, fed-
eral preemption, is determined to be the basis of the opinion, the
applicability of section 517.301 of the Florida Statutes (1977) to.
interstate transactions, especially in light of the recent holding of a
federal district court in Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell,"5
is subject to doubt.
In Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, a United States
district court found that the Idaho takeover statute"6 effectively
destroyed the congressional plan set forth in the Williams Act for
making cash tender offers and, therefore, was preempted by that
Act. The court ruled that the Williams Act regulates the making of
tender offers for the benefit of stockholders while the Idaho statute
regulates the making of tender offers primarily for the benefit of
management of the target company. The court found that the Idaho
statute violated the commerce clause of the Constitution because it
did not regulate a legitimate local interest, it had a substantial
effect on interstate commerce, and the burden imposed on inter-
state commerce was excessive in relation to any local benefits de-
rived from the statute.
Undoubtedly, this case will be the subject of much commen-
tary.0 7 Nevertheless, the validity of the Investor Protection Act, as
adopted in the 1977 session of the Florida Legislature, is subject to
question by virtue of the ruling of the district court in Great
Western. While the court did not find that the Williams Act was
intended to occupy the field of tender offer or takeover legislation
and that the dominance of the federal interest in securities regula-
tion does not preempt state regulation, it did find that the Idaho
205. 439 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Tex. 1977). The case was on appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit when settled.
206. IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1501 to 1513 (Supp. 1977). The statute required that a tender
offeror register his offering with an appropriate state officer and withhold making an offer
until the registration was declared effective. Prior to the effective date, management could
demand a hearing in" order to determine whether the registration should be declared effective.
Moreover, extraterritorial effect was given to the statute by forbidding a tender offer to be
made to stockholders of a target company in any state until approved in Idaho for purposes
of stockholders located therein. Finally, the statute exempted from regulation a "friendly
tender offer," that is, an offer which the management of the target company recommended
to its shareholders.
207. The case has already been the subject of two significant articles. See Langevoort,
supra note 183, at 241-56; Wilner & Landy, supra note 183, at 15-31.
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statute conflicted with the Williams Act and was therefore
preempted by the Williams Act in a number of particulars. There
is a justification for distinguishing the Idaho Act from its Florida
counterpart, however, on the basis that its cumulative effect was to
weigh the scales heavily in favor of management of the target com-
pany without considering the protection of the stockholders. Ac-
cordingly, the usefulness of the Williams Act was affected and,
therefore, the Idaho act was preempted.10 The Investor Protection
Act, as adopted in Florida, does not contain any of the provisions
which the district court in Great Western found so offensive.0 9 The
Act does not mirror the Williams Act but is based on the same
policy considerations as is the Williams Act; that is, a stockholder
who is the subject of a tender offer should be given fair and full
disclosure of material information regarding the cash offer and a
meaningful opportunity to consider the offer so that he may intelli-
gently determine whether to accept or reject it. The principal differ-
ences between the provisions of the Williams Act and the provisions
of the Investor Protection Act are as follows. The Williams Act
comes into play when a transfer of more than five percent of the
outstanding equity securities of the offeree company are traded,2t 0
whereas the Investor Protection Act is applicable when a ten percent
transfer takes place.2 ' Moreover, the Williams Act requires that the
offer remain open for a minimum of seven days,' and the Investor
Protection Act requires that the offer remain open for a minimum
of thirty days.' In addition, the Williams Act permits the tendering
stockholder to withdraw his tender any time after the first seven
days of an offer,"' while the Investor Protection Act provides that
the stockholder may withdraw the tender at any time within the
first fifteen days of the offer."' Finally, the Williams Act provides
for proration for shares tendered when an offer is made for less than
208. See note 207 supra.
209. The same cannot be said for the takeover legislation contained in FLA. STAT. §
628.461 & 659.14 (1977) with respect to Florida based insurance companies and banks.
210. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(d)(5) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5)
(1976)).
211. FLA. STAT. § 517.351(13) (1977). To the extent that a statutory tender offer under
the Investor Protection Act is deemed to include privately negotiated transactions in which
control securities are sold, the scope of the Act may be subject to a federal preemption
challenge inasmuch as the Williams Act has not been so extended.
212. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(d)(5) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5)
(1976)).
213. FLA. STAT. § 517.353(2) (1977).
214. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(d)(5) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5)
(1976)).
215. FLA. STAT. § 517.353(3) (1977).
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all of the outstanding shares and a greater number of shares are
tendered if the tenders occur within the first ten days of the offer;
thereafter, an offeror may purchase shares on a first-come-first-
serve basis.2"' On the other hand, the Investor Protection Act pro-
vides for proration for all tendering shareholders irrespective of
when the tenders were received."'
While the Florida act is certainly less burdensome on interstate
commerce than the Idaho act, it is not clear whether it will survive
the test established by the court in Great Western. It certainly has
a better chance than the Idaho act and a better chance than other
state takeover legislation which is similar to that act. A definitive
ruling in the area which will be a sufficient guide to counsel proba-
bly will not be forthcoming until an appellate court reviews the
substantive decision of the district court."8
2. DEFINITION OF A SECURITY
Section 517.02(1) of the Florida Statutes (1977) defines a secu-
rity for purposes of securities regulatory law in Florida. The statu-
tory definition is virtually the same as that contained in section 2(1)
of the Securities Act of 1933,219 and similar to that contained in
section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.20 In all three
acts, a security is broadly defined with the explicit objective of
including all types of instruments that, in the ordinary course of
financial and commercial dealings, fall within the concept of a secu-
rity including bonds, debentures and common and preferred stock.
Furthermore, a security includes all types of mediums of investment
of a more general character which conceptually include a
"certificate of interest or participation in any profit sharing agree-
ment . . . . [an] investment contract . . . . or in general, any
instrument commonly known as a 'security.' "221
The most recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in this area is United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman.
2
2
There, the Court noted that the focus of the Securities Act of 1933
216. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(d)(6) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6)
(1976)).
217. FLA. STAT. § 517.353(4) (1977).
218. The brief of the appellants suggested to the appellate court that the district court's
invalidation of the Idaho statute implicitly invalidates all state takeover legislation which is
similar to the Idaho act. The appellants included the Investor Protection Acts of Colorado
and Florida in their list of similar takeover legislation.
219. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1976).
220. Id. § 78e(10).
221. Id.
222. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
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and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is on the regulation of the
capital markets of the free enterprise system; the regulation of the
movement of capital from those who have it to those who need it,
with the expectation and purpose of making a profit on the utiliza-
tion of the capital.2 3 Therefore, the Court found that the phrase
"investment contract," as utilized in both federal acts and as de-
fined by prior case decisional law,224 is the same an any "instrument
commonly known as a 'security.' "225 In either case, the Court added,
"[t]he touchstone is the presence of an investment in a common
venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be de-
rived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others."2 26 By
profits, theCourt had reference either to "capital appreciation re-
sulting from the development of the initial investment . . . or [to]
a participation in earnings resulting from the use of the investors'
funds." ' 7 In such cases, the Court noted, the investor is "attracted
solely by the prospects of a return on his investment.""22
Applying this approach to the relevant facts, the Court in
Forman found that purchaser of "common stock" in the government
subsidized cooperative housing project were "attracted solely by the
prospect of acquiring a place to live, and not by financial returns
on their investments.""22 The Court observed that no profit tradi-
tionally associated with securities was offered as an inducement to
the purchasers. The Court specifically noted that there was no
chance of "capital appreciation" upon resale of the stock, and that
income derived from the leasing of the cooperative's commercial
facilities would be used to reduce tenant rental costs and was far too
speculative and insubstantial to be a factor in the determination.
Furthermore, the Court stated that tax benefits accruing to an
apartment owner by virtue of the deductibility of interest payments
on his mortgage did not constitute a profit inasmuch as they are
"nothing more than that which is available to any homeowner who
pays interest on his mortgage." 3° The common stock was thus held
not to be a security for purposes of federal securities law.
The similarity of statutory definition in the Florida Sale of
223. Id. at 849.
224. Tcherepnia v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 339 (1967); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S.
293, 298-99 (1946); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 352 (1943); SEC v.
Koscot Interplanetary Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enter-
prises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).




229. Id. at 853.
230. Id. at 855.
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Securities Law and the Securities Act of 1933 supports prior deci-
sions of Florida courts holding that the definitions of a security
under federal and Florida law closely parallel one another.23' The
most recent Florida case reasserting this principle is Levine v. I. R. E.
Properties, Inc.23 In Levine, the court reversed the entry of sum-
mary judgment against two individual plaintiffs on the issue of
whether realty agreements, by which the plaintiffs purchased an
apartment complex from the corporate defendant, constituted a
security. In addition to the sale of the complex, the agreement also
provided that the defendant would manage the property for the
benefit of the plaintiffs as the plaintiffs' agent. The agreement,
however, was cancellable by either party upon thirty days' written
notice. There was no evidence that the defendant solicited sales,
sold improved real property with a management contract on a regu-
lar basis as a business, or promoted the sale of the complex on the
basis of an expectation of "tax sheltered" profit or otherwise.
Presumably, the trial court had found that no common enter-
prise existed and the purchasers were not expecting profits from the
efforts of the defendants because of the thirty day cancellation pro-
vision in the management contract.233 Citing for support decisions
of the Supreme Court of the United States under the Securities Act
of 1933 and the United States district court in Sunshine Kitchens
v. Atlanthus Corp.,"23 the court ruled that the fact that the manage-
ment contract was cancellable on thirty days' notice was not conclu-
sive with respect to whether the agreements constituted an invest-
ment contract and, therefore, a security. The court found that, on
the basis of prior decisional law, there were genuine issues of mate-
rial fact with respect to whether the agreements were a security, and
that it would be necessary for the trial court to consider evidence
and proof beyond the agreements themselves. Therefore, the court
reversed the entry of summary judgment and remanded for further
proceedings.
21
In Sunshine Kitchens, the district court found that the pur-
chase of computers by the plaintiff, under an agreement whereby
the defendant would manage the leasing arrangement of the com-
puters for the plaintiff, did not constitute the sale of a security
231. See O'Neill v. State, 336 So. 2d 699, 701 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976); Frye v. Taylor, 263
So. 2d 835, 839-40 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972); Florida Discount Centers, Inc. v. Antinori, 226 So.
2d 693, 695 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969), aff'd, 232 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1970). Compare SEC v. W.J. Howey
Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) with McElfresh v. State, 151 Fla. 140, 9 So. 2d 277 (1942).
232. 344 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
233. See 344 So. 2d at 939-40 (dicta).
234. 403 F. Supp.719 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
235. 344 So. 2d at 940.
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within the meaning of the federal and Florida securities laws on the
basis of prior Supreme Court rulings, including Forman. The trans-
action was structured and sold by the defendant as a tax shelter so
that the plaintiff would be able to utilize the investment tax credit
and accelerated depreciation provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 to "shelter" any "income" received from leasing of the
computers or to "shelter" income received from other sources,
thereby providing an investment return in cash proceeds without
concomitant taxable income. In addition, plaintiff alleged that it
expected a cash return on its investment when the computers were
sold some years later.3 '
Interpreting the decisions of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit in SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. 37 and
SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp.,238 the court was of the opin-
ion that the "common enterprise" criterion of an investment con-
tract were not met solely by a common enterprise in which the
plaintiff and the defendant are the only two parties to the transac-
tion. Since there was no evidence that additional persons were solic-
ited or sold similar computer sale-leaseback management packages,
the court seemingly found that the common enterprise test of an
investment contract was not met. 39
The court in Sunshine Kitchens further held that anticipation
of favorable income tax benefits because of the tax shelter character
of the investment did not constitute "profits" of an investment
contract according to the Forman tests. The court reasoned that the
''economic realities of the situation" were an interest in showing a
loss on the plaintiff's records, rather than profits stemming from the
defendant's efforts. 0 Therefore, the court found that the transac-
tion did not involve the sale of a security for purposes of federal
securities law and granted the motion of the defendant for summary




The decision of the district court in this case is arguably incor-
rect. It reflects a misunderstanding of the investment motivation of
the purchaser of a tax shelter and the effect a tax shelter has in
generating actual cash profits to an investor. This sheltering of cash
receipts from the tax shelter business or from other business sources
would otherwise be treated as taxable income. In addition, the deci-
236. 403 F. Supp. at 720.
237. 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974).
238. 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974).
239. 403 F. Supp. at 721-22.
240. Id. at 722.
241. Id. at 723.
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sion reflects a lack of understanding of the vital role of the promoter
in structuring the tax shelter and maintaining it as a shelter during
the course of the business. The court strictly construed the rulings
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
Continental Commodities and Koscot Interplanetary to require that
the promoter solicit and sell to many investors the same arrange-
ment or scheme in order to constitute, by definition, an investment
contract.
It has been suggested that this interpretation of the appellate
court opinions in these cases is overly restrictive"' and seems to be
in possible conflict with the opinion of the District Court of Appeals
for the Third District in Levine. Furthermore, the Supreme Court
of the United States' opinion in Forman, to the effect that the
primary purpose and focus of the federal securities laws is the regu-
lation of the movement of capital in the free enterprise system based
on the prospect of making profit, is as applicable to the mechanics
of a tax shelter as to any other securities transaction. In essence, the
district court in Sunshine Kitchens may have lost sight of the basic
economic policies inherent in the securities acts as expressed by the
Supreme Court' and, in so doing, misapplied the law to the facts.
Notwithstanding the shortcomings of the court's decision, the
case is significant. It is the first case in which the Fifth Circuit,
under the Florida Sale of Securities Law, passed on whether a
''common enterprise" may exist where the agreement or scheme
involves only one investor and one promoter. Further, it is authority
for the proposition that a "pure tax shelter" does not constitute a
medium of investment which can be characterized as an investment
contract and, therefore, as a security. Consequently, promoters of
242. See, e.g., Jones v. International Inv., Inc., 429 F. Supp. 119, 123-24 (N.D. Ga. 1977);
Huberman v. Denny's Restaurant, Inc. 337 F. Supp. 1249, 1251 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
243. See 421 U.S. at 852. Another way to analyze this case, by analogy to Forman, would
be to determine whether the defendant intended to use the computer "in house" and lease it
out on a time-sharing basis in order to subsidize its cost of utilization, or whether the plaintiff
purchased the computer as a tax shelter to make money by leasing it to others; and, not
knowing how to lease computers, engaged the defendant as a part of the transaction. In the
former case an argument could be made that under Forman no sale of a security occurred
since the lease of the equipment to others was simply to lower its costs to the purchaser. See
id. at 853. On the other hand, under the latter analysis there would be a sale of a.security
under Forman, as the expectant profit is based on the efforts of others. These contrasting
possibilities are suggested by the Court's language in Forman, where it stated:
There is no doubt that purchasers in this housing cooperative sought to obtain a
decent home at an attractive price. But that type of economic interest character-
izes every form of commercial dealing. What distinguishes a security transac-
tion-and what is absent here-is an investment where one parts with his money
in hope of receiving profits from the efforts of others, and not where he purchases
a commodity for personal consumption or living quarters for personal use.
Id. at 858.
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tax shelters who contend they are not selling securities will probably
rely on the decision.
3. VIOLATION OF THE ANTI-FRAUD PROVISIONS
The basic anti-fraud provisions of the Florida Sale of Securities
Law are contained in section 517.301 of the Florida Statutes,
adopted in 1965.44 The statute is based on the substantive provi-
sions of section 17 of the Securities Act of 1933245 and Rule 10b-5
promulgated under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.45
In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., v. Byrne,247 the
court opined that both the better reasoned decisions and the clear
weight of authority held that scienter was not a necessary element
to recovery under the comparable sections of federal law and thus
should not be required under section 517.302(1) of the Florida Stat-
utes (1975).241
Subsequent to the decision of the court in Byrne, however, the
Supreme Court of the United States, in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder,45 found that the nature of the conduct proscribed by
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was such that
the Court found it difficult to believe that "any lawyer, legislative
draftsman, or legislator would use these words if the intent was to
create liability for merely negligent acts or omissions. '250 The Court
noted that the administrative history of the rule likewise supported
an interpretation that the rule was "intended to apply only to activi-
ties that involved scienter.
' '251
Since Hochfelder, no cases have been decided under section
244. 1965 Fla. Laws, ch. 65-428.
245. 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970).
246. Compare FLA. STAT. § 517.301(1) (1977) with 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1976); 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5 (1977).
247. 320 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
248. Id. at 440.
249. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
250. Id. at 203.
251. Id. at 212. The question expressly left open by the Court in Hochfelder was the
precise definition of "scienter." The Court defined "scienter" as the "mental state embracing
intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Id. at 193 n.12. Furthermore, the Court stated
that § 10b of the Securities Exchange Act "was intended to proscribe knowing or intentional
misconduct." Id. at 197. The Court, however, specifically left open the question of whether
reckless behavior was sufficient for civil liability under this section and rule.
In the majority of district and circuit court cases passing on this question since the
decision in Hochfelder, the courts have tended to find that scienter, for purposes of imposition
of civil liability under § 10b and Rule 10b-5, encompassed knowing or intentional misconduct
as well as, conduct which could be characterized as a reckless disregard for the truth. See,
e.g., McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057, 1080 (D. Del. 1976). See also Castruccio,
Developments in Federal Securities Regulation - 1976, 32 Bus. LAw. 1537, 1555-63 (1977).
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517.301(1) passing on whether this section also requires an allega-
tion and proof of "scienter" contrary to the dicta in Byrne. In light
of the Hochfelder decision, the District Court of Appeal, Third Dis-
trict, Was arguably incorrect in its interpretation. The section can
only be traced back to 1965 but is apparently based on federal law,
subject to the interpretation by the Supreme Court in Hochfelder.
This suggests that knowing or reckless conduct is required in order
to sustain a cause of action under section 517.301(1) of the Florida
Statutes (1977).252
4. REMEDIAL PROVISIONS
Section 517.21(1) of the.Florida Statutes (1977) provides that
the purchaser of securities has the right to rescind the transaction
upon the tender of the security sold against the person making the
sale and "every director, officer or agent of or for the seller, if the
director, officer, or agent has personally participated or aided in any
way making the sale." The liability of such a participant or aider is
for the full amount paid by the purchaser with interest, court costs
and reasonable attorney's fees.253 The seller may cut off liability
against itself and participants and aiders by making a "rescission
offer" to the purchaser which must be accepted within thirty days
from the date of tender.
254
Two recent decisions passed on issues arising under the reme-
dial provisions of the Florida Sale of Securities Law. In Merrill
252. Cf. Haygood v. Adams Drugs, Inc., 346 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977) (dismissal of
a complaint seeking rescission of securities sale reversed even though complaint contained
no specific allegations of securities law violations).
To the extent that decisions after Hochfelder do determine that a civil action for violation
of FLA. STAT. § 517.301(1) (1977) must allege scienter (i.e., either intentional, knowing or
reckless conduct), so also a criminal action should require, at least, a general mens rea. There
is no case passing directly on a criminal violation of § 517.301; however, the supreme court
in State v. Houghtaling, 181 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 1965) held that the 1935 amendment to the
Florida Sale of Securities Law eliminated any requirement to prove scienter for purposes of
establishing a criminal conviction for participation in the unlawful sale of unregistered securi-
ties and/or the failure to register as a dealer or salesman under the act. As noted, the case
did not pass on a criminal prosecution for violations of the anti-fraud provisions of the act
presently contained in FLA. STAT. § 517.301(1) (1977). Nevertheless, a number of states
attorneys have attempted to prosecute criminal violations of § 517.301(1) without specific
allegations of scienter either as a general mens rea or a specific mens rea.
253. In addition to the civil remedies available under FLA. STAT. § 517.21 (1977), § 517.23
provides that the same civil remedies available under the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are available to purchasers of securities for violations of the
Florida Sale of Securities Law. The only statutory remedy for sellers of securities is available
under § 517.359 for violations of the Investor Protection Act.
254. It is not clear whether the "rescission offer" provision of FLA. STAT. § 517.21(1)
(1977) would cut off damages sought by the civil litigant under the provision of § 517.23. This
issue has not been addressed in any reported case.
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Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Byrne,255 the court read the
remedial provisions of the act strictly with regard to the facts before
it. The plaintiff had placed an order with the defendant broker to
purchase securities at the market price with a stop loss order to sell
the stock whenever.its market price decreased to a designated price.
The defendant placed the order but for a number of reasons, none
of which could be characterized as intentional, was unable to place
the stop loss order. The defendant did not inform the plaintiff that
it had not placed the stop loss order, but from time to time did
report the market value of the securities at less than the stop loss
price as well as prices in excess of the stop loss price. The plaintiff
knew, therefore, and had an opportunity to sell the securities in
excess of the stop loss price but at less than the purchase price.
The trial court found that the defendant's failure to advise the
plaintiff that a stop loss order could not be and had not been entered
constituted an omission to state a material fact in violation of.sec-
tion 517.301(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes (1975). The court rejected
the defenses of estoppel, waiver and ratification, although noting
that such defenses were available in an alleged violation of section
517.301(1). Furthermore, the court stated that the defendant had
not made a rescission offer which would constitute a defense to the
remedial provisions of section 517.21(1) of the Florida Statutes
(1975). Therefore, the court entered judgment in favor of the plain-
tiff for rescission.
258
In affirming the decision, the appellate court rejected the de-
fendant's argument that the later rise in the market value of the
securities above the stop loss price, accompanied by the action of
the defendant in advising the plaintiff and urging him to sell at the
price above the stop loss price but at less than the original acquisi-
tion price, constituted a waiver of remedies or ratification of the
improper acts of the defendant by the plaintiff. Nor did such action
bar the plaintiff from asserting his statutory rights: "We think this
argument is untenable here because the statute clearly and unmis-
takably places the burden on the broker to 'offer in writing' to take
back the securities and refund the purchase price in full together
with interest .. ."257 The court concluded:
And so, if we literally apply the statute - which we must -
the simple answer is that the broker should have immediately
told the buyer he could have his money back and offered it "in
writing" to him. This was not done. The buyer is guilty of noth-
255. 320 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
256. Id. at 438-40.
257. Id. at 441.
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ing. He is protected by the statute. He has the right to invoke its
sanctions. He has done so within the time the statute prescribed
and in the manner prescribed and the trial court was correct in
requiring the broker to do what the statute says it should do and
to add to the judgment the additional charges authorized."'
This decision may be viewed as holding that a plaintiff is es-
topped from asserting or has waived his right to rescind by ratifica-
tion only when the seller of the securities makes a rescission offer
in writing which has not been accepted by the buyer within thirty
days of its tender. Alternatively, the decision could be more nar-
rowly read as stating that insufficient facts were shown to invoke
these defenses. There is authority which tends to support the former
interpretation259 although prior decisions of courts of appeal would
tend to support the latter interpretation."' Most likely, if the price
of the securities had risen above the acquisition price and the plain-
tiff had been informed of this fact, a much better case for estoppel
or waiver might have been made out. Under such circumstances,
Merrill Lynch would probably have advised the defendant of its
inability to place the stop loss order and would have made the
rescission offer in the hope that it would not have been accepted,
or if it had, gambling that they could "sell short."
In Haygood v. Adams Drug, Inc.,26 ' the court passed on the
activity of the defendants alleged to be participants and aiders in
the sale of securities made in violation of sections 517.301(1)(b) and
517.301(1)(c) of the Florida Statutes (1975). The court reviewed the
interpretation of the phrase "personally participated or aided in any
way in making the sale" by noting the interpretation of the Supreme
Court of Florida decision in Nichols v. Yandre6 that the phrase
" 'implies some activity in inducing the purchaser to invest.' ,''23
One defendant had personally solicited the plaintiff to make the
stock purchase. This act seemed to constitute participation in the
sale of common stock. Three other individual defendants, however,
did not participate directly; rather, they were alleged to have known
that the sale would be made by means of financial statements con-
258. Id.
259. See Dokken v. Minnesota-Ohio Oil Corp., 232 So. 2d 200, 205 n.2 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970)
(McNulty, J., dissenting).
260. See Henderson v. Hayden, Inc., 461 F.2d 1069, 1073 (5th Cir. 1972); Dokken v.
Minnesota-Ohio Oil Corp., 232 So. 2d 200, 203 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
261. 346 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
262. 151 Fla. 87, 9 So. 2d 157 (1942).
263. 346 So. 2d at 614 (quoting Nichols, 9 So. 2d at 160) (emphasis added). See also
Ruden v. Medalie, 294 So. 2d 403, 406 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974) (discussed in Edwards, supra note
92).
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taining material omissions or misstatements regarding a prior stock
split and shortages in stock and trade which had resulted in sub-
stantial net operating loss not shown in the financial statements. It
was further alleged that these defendants either prepared or assisted
in the preparation of the statements and, knowingly concealed the
inventory shortage, the net operating loss and the stock split.264
The court concluded that the plaintiff's complaint, for purposes
of a motion to dismiss, was sufficient to allege a cause of action
against all individual defendants in their capacities as officers
and/or directors who participated or aided in a violation of the act.
The court found that the plaintiff had pled knowledge of the matters
which were omitted in the financial statements, awareness that the
financial statements would be issued and relied upon by prospective
investors in connection with the purchase of the offered securities,
and concealment of the existence of the material facts from disclo-
sure in the financial statements. The court held that such activity
violated the Act and that it constituted participation or aiding in
the unlawful sale of securities within the meaning of section 517.21
(1) of the Florida Statutes (1975), thereby subjecting all defendants
to liability under that section. 6 '
264. 346 So. 2d at 613-14.
265. Id. at 614.
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